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The use of so-called cyber weapons is becoming an increasingly common aspect of 
modern rivalries. The relatively low costs, reduced barriers of entry and difficulties in detection 
are said to make cyber attacks an attractive option for both state and non-state actors. While there 
is extensive analysis and writing about specific cyber incidents - which has generated some 
common ideas about the reasons why states conduct them – there is very little quantitative 
analysis available to support any theories about use or predict future action, despite the growing 
importance of the cyber domain.  This thesis seeks to help fill that gap.   
By using multi-variable regression analysis on a dataset that includes 77 cases of 
interstate rival dyads and eleven variables, I test three theories about the rivalry conditions under 
which states are most likely to initiate a cyber operation.  I argue that this is most likely to 
happen when the intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high; or when there is 
significant economic and military asymmetry within the dyad; or when the two rivals are 
interconnected through trade or bilateral agreements. The empirical analysis is supplemented by 














Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The use of so-called cyber weapons is becoming an increasingly common aspect of 
modern rivalries. The relatively low costs, reduced barriers of entry and difficulties in detection 
are said to make cyber attacks an attractive option for both state and non-state actors. There is a 
growing literature about the impact of cyber conflict on international relations and its 
implications for national security, national boundaries, the ever expanding role of non-state 
actors and public-private sector collaboration. For many states, gaining an offensive capability in 
the cyber realm is rapidly becoming a priority. A 2011 survey by the United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) showed that 68 of the 193 UN Member States had cyber 
security programmes and that 32 of those states included cyber warfare in their military planning 
and organization. There are now several documented cases of hostile state-to-state cyber 
operations using tactics such as distributed denials of service, intrusions, sabotage, website 
defacement and worms and viruses.  
Yet while it’s clear that many states are becoming eager to establish capacity in this 
arena, both offensive and defensive, and that the effects of a full blown attack could be crippling, 
the general trend has been to engage in mild or moderate operations that cause headaches of 
frustration rather than serious damage to the victim state.  Is this trend likely to continue? How 
can the international community become better placed to respond to the unique challenges of the 
cyber environment? 
This thesis seeks to supplement what is already known and documented about instances 
of cyber weapons use by looking more closely at the conditions under which states use them and 
the dynamics of the rivalries in which they have been used. While there is extensive analysis and 
writing about specific cyber operations – that have generated some common ideas about the 
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reasons why states conduct them – there is very little quantitative analysis available to support 
any theories about use or predict future action. Yet as more and more states choose to develop 
capacity in this area, the need for such understanding will also increase. The same will be true of 
the calls for regulation of cyber warfare, which can only be effective if they are based on 
accurate patterns of and reasons for use, rooted in a solid understanding of what the political 
obstacles are. In order for the international community to address legal and policy gaps in a 
meaningful way, and while the technology is still emerging, it is helpful to have a clearer 
understanding of what motivates states to use cyber technology in a hostile or antagonistic way 
against their rivals. Current patterns of use are beginning to create new behavioral norms that are 
so far largely tolerated or accepted but that also reflect the many gaps and grey areas in 
international law with respect to interstate cyber warfare.  
The primary research question that this thesis will answer is: what are the rivalry dynamics 
that cause a cyber interaction between two states?  In the course of answering this question the 
following additional research questions will also be examined: 
 Does the intensity of a rivalry impact the likelihood of a cyber operation taking place? 
 Do states only initiate cyber operations against rivals or opponents who are economically 
weaker? 
 
 Do states only initiate cyber operations against rivals or opponents who are militarily 
weaker? 
 
 Are states more or less likely to use cyber weapons against a rival with whom they are 
closely interconnected through bilateral treaties or trade dependency? 
 
Based on the learning that emerges from addressing the above questions, the thesis will also 
address the following:  
 How are states using cyber technology as a weapon against their rivals and to 
accomplish what types of goals? 
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 What are the major challenges that policy makers face in order to regulate the use of 
cyber technology when intended as a weapon?  
 
 What regional instruments, common positions or codes of conduct currently exist to 
guide state policy on ‘cyber warfare’? 
 
As stated earlier, the majority of hostile cyber activity among rival states has not been as 
severe as it could be. This suggests that rivals are so far using cyber technology in a manner 
consistent with how they normally interact and that many rivals have not even engaged with one 
another in this way. I argue here that there exists a higher level of intensity among the dyads 
where there has been cyber activity (cyber dyads) than among those where no such activity has 
taken place (non-use dyads) because as intensity increases, so too does the level of antagonistic 
behaviour and potential reasons to engage in a hostile cyber operation.  
It is often said that what makes cyber use attractive to smaller states are the relatively low 
costs and barriers to entry. The logic follows that it should be possible for states to initiate an 
operation against larger or more powerful opponents using cyber technology.  Yet the most 
severe cyber operations on record were conducted against states that were significantly militarily 
and economically weaker than those attacking them and the most prolific users of cyber weapons 
continue to be economically developed states that also have strong militaries. Therefore, I predict 
greater disparity between the use dyads than the non-use dyads represented by a high degree of 
economic and military asymmetry within the dyad. In addition, I expect that the dyads that have 
experienced a cyber event will be more interconnected through trade and bilateral treaties. My 
rationale is that in spite of their economic or other closeness, these states are still rivals, seeking 
to find an advantage over the other. Yet using other means of warfare or applying methods such 
as sanctions present challenges to pursuing those advantages. As such, a cyber operation which is 
easier to hide and less physically damaging or morally unacceptable presents a viable option.  
6 
 
Based on the above, which is predicated both on what is known about how cyber 
technology has been used to date, as a ‘weapon’, and also about the behavior of rivals, my 
hypothesis includes three arguments. I propose that states are likely to initiate a cyber dispute or 
incident against a rival when:   
Hypothesis 1: The intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high;  
Hypothesis 2: When there is economic and/or military asymmetry within the dyad; 
Hypothesis 3: When the two rivals are interconnected through trade or bilateral 
agreements. 
 
The dependent variable is a cyber incident or dispute, a term that will be defined in 
Chapter Three. There are three variables that support the hypotheses above: intensity of the 
rivalry; military and economic asymmetry; and the level of interconnectedness.  The thesis 
further explores three other variables: the possession of nuclear weapons by any of the two states 
in the dyad; the location of the rivals within the same geographic region or not; and sharing or 
not sharing the same civilization type. A more detailed explanation of how these variables are 
measured and defined is outlined in Chapter Three.  
This thesis will utilize a regression analysis methodology in order to determine the 
impact of the three explanatory variables on the dependent variable. The data set for this analysis 
has been expanded from an original data set created by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness, 
published in 2014. Their research considered 126 rival dyads over a ten-year time period in order 
to quantitatively examine how many of those rivals are using cyber tactics against one another 
and how frequently they do so. Of the 126 rival country dyads that were considered by Valeriano 
and Maness only 20 had engaged in cyber disputes or incidents.  My dataset include all 20 dyads 
that have engaged in cyber interactions (cyber dyads) as well as another 57 non-cyber dyads.  
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This thesis explores but does not commit to a definition as to what a cyber weapon and 
cyber attack are, as well as what constitutes cyber warfare. I agree with the original researchers 
that these terms are problematic and still not agreed upon by the international community and as 
such, I have chosen to retain their vocabulary as much as possible in my thesis.   
The thesis will follow a variable-by-variable approach to explaining the findings of the 
regression analysis.  This will include an examination of how each independent variable, as well 
as the other three, relate to one another and their influence on the primary research question.  The 
analysis will be followed by two case studies. The first focuses on China and the United States 
(U.S) and the second on China and Japan.   The objective in presenting these case studies is to 
delve deeper into the context surrounding inter-state cyber interactions in order to illustrate how 
states are using cyber space to advance various foreign policy or security objectives as well as 
demonstrate how the use of cyber tactics, in turn, impacts the rivalry dynamics of the dyad. 
The thesis will conclude with a summary of the findings from this research along with 
suggestions for additional research. This will also include policy recommendations on priority 
issues such as resolving dispute over basic terminology and approaches; ensuring that the 
multiple processes and fora on cyber issues are compatible and complementary and dealing 













Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
 This chapter provides an overview of existing literature about how states are engaging 
with cyber technology, including how the subject fits within the broader framework of 
international relations theory and relates to concepts such as deterrence and restraint. The review 
illustrates different perspectives on how to best approach regulating the use of cyber weapons, 
including from an international humanitarian law perspective. This chapter further explores 
different understandings of rivalry and how the behavior of rival states informs my theories. In 
this chapter, disputed terms such as ‘cyber warfare’ or ‘cyber attack’ are utilized in order to 
reflect the language of the scholars and experts being cited although elsewhere in the thesis I 
utilize different terminology.  
A harbinger of war to come? 
 
 ‘Cyber warfare’ is increasingly in the news headlines and also making its way 
into the plots of movies, television series and pop-culture more generally. It is a term not always 
well understood or defined, either by academics, diplomats or the media and can refer to a range 
of activities, both domestic and international, such as espionage, hacking and surveillance. A full 
definition of how this thesis defines cyber war will be provided in the following chapter but it’s 
important to begin by noting that each scholar brings a slightly different understanding of what it 
means to their work, as do policy experts and government officials. For example, a report 
released in October 2014 compiles existing definitions for commonly used cyber security and 
information security related terms as used by governments, security bodies and research 
institutes.
1
 There are thirteen recorded entries for “cyber attack” which range from a militarized 
perspective as put forward by NATO (“A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or 
                                                 
1
 Robert Morgus and Tim Maurer, Compilation of Existing Cybersecurity and Information Security Related 
Definitions (New America Foundation, October 2014). 
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defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects.”) to New Zealand’s lighter understanding of the term (“An attempt to 
undermine or compromise the function of a computer-based system, access information, or 
attempt to track the online movements of individuals without their permission.”).  
Possibly as an extension of this, debate exists among scholars and experts on the extent to 
which cyber warfare poses a substantial security threat.  At one end of the spectrum are those 
who take the threat very seriously and see the rise of digital warfare as symptomatic of larger 
changes taking place within the international landscape. Against the backdrop of globalization 
and rapid growth of the internet and digital technologies in general, it was easy for scholars such 
as Arquila and Ronfeldt, writing during the early 1990s, to make the argument that the internet 




 As they 
explained, the information revolution is capable of setting in motion forces that challenge the 
design of many institutions, including the hierarchies around which institutions are normally 
designed.
3
  It also diffuses and redistributes power in ways that may benefit weaker, smaller 
actors and will have an impact on military organization and doctrine more broadly. Arquila and 
Ronfeldt believed that while the impact is not yet clear, a change is on the horizon and must be 
taken into consideration by policy makers and military officials.  
Similarly, Farwell and Rohozinski use the case of the Stuxnet attack on Iranian 
centrifuges as a way to demonstrate the growing strategic importance of using cyber weapons.
4
  
They ask if a cyber attack offers a better risk–benefit trade-off for achieving political or military 
goals than a conventional military attack and note that in the case of Stuxnet in particular, it was 
                                                 
2
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyber War Is Coming!,” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993) 31. 
3
 Ibid 26. 
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effective in slowing the development of the Iranian nuclear programme.
5
 Maurer makes a related 
point. In one of his articles, he outlines three factors that will determine whether or not cyber 
warfare will actually reduce the human costs of war. The conditions include: improvements in 
security, how the norms governing use of cyber weapons evolve, and the role of non-state 
actors.
6
 While much remains to be seen, he concludes that a digital Pearl Harbor would cost 
fewer lives than the real attack 70 years ago did.
7
 This is a controversial question, yet one well 
worth exploring. If strategic goals can be obtained without any human cost, should cyber 
weapons use be encouraged – albeit within certain parameters? This has implications for 
regulation and particularly the debate among international humanitarian law (IHL) experts.  
Other scholars have been more reluctant to view cyber warfare as anything more than a 
trend with few real implications for international relations. Rid, who has provided one of the 
most vociferous responses to the so-called ‘alarmist’ camp of literature, states that full blown 
cyber war will not take place because the inherently non-violent nature of cyber confrontations 
presents a challenge to the normal conduct of war.
8
  As he explains, there are three main forms of 
cyber threats - espionage, sabotage and subversion - none of which are especially violent. As a 
result, Rid feels it necessary to realistically assess who is truly vulnerable – countries, industries 
or individuals – because the threat may be less acute in some sectors than others, and response 
should be developed according to the actual threat. Erik Gartzke has noted that while it is 
increasingly common for a state to deploy a hostile cyber attack, such attacks do not take the 
                                                 
5
 Ibid 29. 
6
 Tim Maurer, “The Case for Cyber Warfare,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/19/the_case_for_cyberwar. 
7
 Ibid.  
8
 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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Stephen Walt has identified another way to more effectively evaluate the real threat 
posed by cyber weapons. He has suggested that research should better distinguish and consider 
separately the different and separate dangers that emerge from a cyber attack instead of grouping 
them together under the common rubric of cyber warfare.
10
  Walt identifies four such distinct 
dangers, or issues: degrading an enemy’s military capabilities, penetrating networks to shut down 
civilian infrastructure, web-based criminal activity, and cyber espionage. As he explains, making 
these distinctions could help determine if the fuss over cyber warfare is legitimate or just an 
example of threat inflation.
11
  The interactions that are included in this thesis cover three of those 
four types of actions. Web-based criminal activity is excluded. It could be said that the other 
three types of dangers, or actions, constitute web-based criminal activity or should become 
illegal under international law, but most often the term refers to acts such as infringements of 
copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography, hate crimes, and violations of network 
security. 
This more sober and cautious perspective about the actual threat of cyber conflict is 
reinforced by the significant statistical research undertaken by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan 
Maness, on which this thesis is based.  In their opinion, the field of cyber security needs to return 
to social science in order to “definitively engage the cyber debate with facts, figures and 
theory.”
12
 The results are compelling as they reveal that only 20 of 124 “active rivals” - defined 
                                                 
9
 Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International Security 
38, no. 2 (October 2013): p.42 
10








as the most conflict-prone pairs of states in the international system – actually engaged one 
another in cyber conflict and that there were only 95 total cyber attacks among these 20 rivals.
13
 
Their research demonstrates statistically that inter-state cyber interactions do not happen as 
frequently as many assume and that the severity of operations is consistent and relatively 
restrained.    
Policy and practice 
One of the most comprehensive and up to date sources of information about current state 
policy with regard to cyber warfare is The Cyber Index produced by UNIDIR, the Institute for 
Peace Research and Security Policy and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. In 
addition, many states outline their positions on the subject as part of the national statements they 
deliver during the annual deliberations of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee on 
Disarmament and International Security.  One of the most thorough accounts of the historical 
evolution of cyber warfare is A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace 1986 to 2012.
14
 The 
book outlines three distinct phases – realization, take-off and militarization – and provides in-
depth analysis of 12 case studies of use, well as a glossary and timeline. A further resource that 
provides – albeit more cursory – analysis of major cyber attacks is Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: 
What everyone needs to know.
15
  There are numerous credible resources available pertaining to 
some of the more high profile cyber attacks that have occurred in recent years including the 
American-Israeli Stuxnet attack on Iran in 2010 and Russian-sponsored attacks on Estonia and 
Georgia in 2007. The media in many countries has extensively covered the subject of cyber 
warfare by documenting attacks as they unfolded or in noting new cooperation and policy 
                                                 
13
 B. Valeriano and R. C. Maness, “The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists, 2001-11,” Journal 
of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (May 1, 2014) 1. 
14
 Jason Healey, A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 - 2012 (U.S.A: The Atlantic Council, 2013). 
15
 Peter Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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developments between nations on the topic.  However, attribution and accuracy always present a 
challenge as do the limitations of access to sensitive information. 
International law and regulation 
One of the largest challenges facing scholars and practitioners in the area of cyber 
warfare and weapons is how to understand the way in which it intersects with existing laws and 
obligations, including international humanitarian law (IHL).  There is substantial writing in this 
area and efforts to situate cyber attacks within existing legal frameworks. This most significant 
resource in this area is the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare. It was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence by an international group of approximately twenty experts over a three year 
period (2009 to 2012). The Manual includes “black letter rules” that are restatements of existing 
international law in a cyber context, and as understood and agreed by all the authors. It further 
includes the legal basis, normative content and practical implications of each rule.
16
 For a rule to 
have been adopted and included in the Manual, all authors needed to have agreed to it by 
consensus. For areas where there were differences of opinion, the Manual includes a 
commentary. 
 One area where there was such a difference of opinion concerns what constitutes an 
attack. The Manual defines a cyber attack as a “cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, 
that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to 
objects”. However, as the commentary shows, experts disagreed as to what exactly was to be 
                                                 
16
 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, The Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2013), http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html. 
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understood as damage to objects, and whether or what type of impairment of the functioning of 
an object would fall within its definition.
17
  
 This question has been picked up by Michael Schmitt and Cordula Droege who are 
among a small but burgeoning group of scholars and lawyers who seek to situate a cyber ‘attack’ 
within international humanitarian law (IHL).  Droege argues that any attempt to understand if 
and how cyber war constitutes legal war in the classic sense of armed conflict must consider the 
key IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution as well as the unique 
challenges posed by cyber attacks, which tend to deliberately target or will indirectly impact 
civilian targets.
18
 Schmitt therefore observes that the law of cyber armed conflict remains a work 
in progress, thus hampering global efforts to establish better regulation or responses to cyber 
operations and warfare.
19
 Laurent Gisel reminds policymakers that assessing the legality of new 
weapons – such as cyber weapons - is in the interest of all states, as it will help them ensure that 
their armed forces act in accordance with their international obligations.
20
 He further points out 
that Article 36 of the 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions requires each state 
party to make sure that any new weapons it deploys or considers deploying comply with the rules 
of IHL. This is also a point underscored by the Tallinn Manual.
21
 
Others feel that new laws more specific to cyber threats need to be developed. These may 
or may not be predicated on IHL or humanitarian impact. For many years, states such as Russia 
and China, along with a small handful of experts or advocates, have been calling for such a 
treaty. It may be surprising that two governments that are so active in cyber space are at the 
                                                 
17
 Cordula Droege, “Get off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of 
Civilians,” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (June 5, 2013) 557. 
18
 Ibid 541. 
19
 M. Schmitt, “Classification of Cyber Conflict,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 17, no. 2 (AugU.S.t 8, 
2012): 260. 
20
 Laurent Gisel, The law of war imposes limits on cyber attacks too, Webpage, July 1, 2011, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/06-27-cyber-warfare-ihl.htm. 
21
 Ibid.  
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forefront of this effort and has raised questions from other states about their motives in doing so, 
while simultaneously demonstrating that the most powerful nations are often the most vulnerable 
to a cyber attack, as noted by Courville. Hughes also feels that existing international law fails to 
adequately address cyber threats and argues that it is time for the international community to 
begin work on a global cyber treaty.
22
 He argues that such a treaty could prevent cyberspace 
from becoming a default platform for, or alternate theatre of war in which customary 
international law does not apply and states can thus act freely.  Brown and Friedman disagree 
and feel that there are too many practical difficulties involved in establishing a credible 
verification regime to accompany a potential cyber treaty.
23
 Other critics note that beyond 
technical difficulties,  cultural differences and varied approaches to cyber space would make the 
negotiation, adoption and implementation of such an agreement very difficult.
24
 They further 
argue that cyber weapons are too different from biological and chemical weapons for their 
respective legal frameworks governing to act as a useful model. These differences include the 
dual-use nature of cyber weapons material and the general perception that they are less 
destructive.
25
 Nye Jr. believes that it is more likely that states will work together in order to 
address the cyber threats posed by non-state actors, particularly terrorists, rather than seek to 
limit their own actions, and that the areas of cyber crime or cyber terrorism are easier ones to 
address.
26
 Given that momentum for global regulation has been stalled for so long this 
perspective is not without merit but should not limit the potential for developing regulatory 
norms or agreements perhaps on regional or other bases.   
                                                 
22
 Rex Hughes, “A Treaty for Cyber Space” (International Affairs, March 2010)  
23
 Cameron S. Brown and David Friedman, “A Cyber Warfare Convention? Lessons from the Conventions on 
Chemical and Biological Weapons,” in Arms Control and National Security: New Horizons (Tel Aviv: Institute for 
National Security Studies, 2014), 45–63. 
24
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Theory, power and deterrence 
There is not extensive literature situating cyber warfare within international relations 
theory.  Johan Eriksson and Giacomello Giampier have undertaken to fill this void by analyzing 
the impact of the information revolution on security in order to determine what existing 
international relations theory can say about this challenge. They believe that realism, with its 
emphasis on the primacy of the state, offers the least explanatory power in this instance because 
cyber attacks are frequently carried out or at times instigated by non-state actors. It does however 
offer a basis for the view that cyber warfare is the continuation of other types of warfare.
27
 As 
Eriksson and Giampiero note, cyber becomes relevant to realists when viewed as a new 
technological component within warfare more broadly. To date, this is largely how cyber 
weapons are actually being used. The two case studies included in this thesis will highlight that.  
Constructivism offers useful insights for explaining the symbolism and identity-based 
aspects of cyber conflict although is limited in its ability to explain the motivation of states to use 
cyber weapons.
28
 One noteworthy constructivist approach to security that they describe is the 
theory of "securitization" developed by the Copenhagen school. This is about how, when, and 
with what consequences political actors frame something as a matter of security.
29
 The 
Copenhagen school emphasizes the implications of "speech acts", or political language, for 
political agenda-setting and political relations. Viewed this way, acts that invade privacy or other 
online activities can be legitimized by authorities because the threat, whether valid or not, has 
been securitized and framed as a threat, through clever use of language.  
                                                 
27
 Johan Eriksson and Giacomello Giampiero, “The Information Revolution, Security, and International Relations: 
(IR) Relevant Theory?” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 27, no. 3 
(July 2006), 228. 
28
 Ibid 236.  
29
 Ibid 234. 
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Liberalism appears to provide the best framework for explaining many of the basic 
features of cyber warfare, such as the multiplicity of transnational non-state actors, the erosion of 
national boundaries and the vulnerability of networked economies.
30
 Despite offering such a 
relevant framework, they note that few liberals have engaged with the topic of cyber or the 
broader information revolution. Among those who have are Nye Jr. and Keohane. Eriksson and 
Giampier explain that their influential theory of complex interdependence initially developed in 
the 1970s has been updated in light of the challenges of the digital age. The updated version adds 
two new components to their theory – sensitivity and vulnerability – viewed as the costs of 
interdependence.
31
 In the update, Nye Jr. has also elaborated his theory of soft power to argue 
that soft power is becoming more important in the digital age than ever before, mainly because 
of the evolving multiple channels of global communication that easily transcend sovereign 
boundaries.   Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and 
policies ... Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.
32
   
Nye Jr. has also put forward an explanation of cyber power. He explains that the 
characteristics of cyber space are such that they reduce some of the power differentials among 
actors, and therefore have the potential to create power shifts among states.
33
 This occurs when 
limited opportunities open up for small states to leapfrog over larger ones, which would increase 
the diffusion of power to non-state actors although there will always be some states that continue 
to be more powerful than others. Evidence demonstrates that the most consistent users of cyber 
weapons are large and already powerful or developed states and that as of yet, developing 
                                                 
30
 Ibid 231. 
31
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nations are not taking advantage of this opportunity. This thesis argues the same although the 
case studies illustrate that among the cyber capable, this approach is being employed such as by 
China. Sheldon examines the different roles that developed and developing states play in policy 
discussions, nothing that much of the debate about cyber in the diplomatic and international 
security agenda have revolved around the concerns of developed countries, while developing 
countries have either been silent, ignored or as he says, cast as “cyber villains”. He argues that 
while there is a gap in developing world participation in the global dialogue and debate on 
cyberspace issues, there are several important areas of interdependent and common interest in 
cyberspace of equal importance to both developed and developing states.
34
 This includes a 
growing level of vulnerability of developing nations to a cyber attack and also their role as cyber 
technology manufacturers. 
Stemming from this is debate as to what lessons can be applied to cyber from experience 
in controlling the use and spread of nuclear weapons.  Libicki has pointed out that there are 
critical differences between cyber weapons and nuclear weapons that must be considered. These 
include the challenges of attribution; the limited possibilities for a second strike, retaliation or 
sustained attack; and the potential for escalation.
35
 Nye agrees with Libicki that these differences 
are real ones, but believes that there are insights learned from nuclear deterrence that could apply 
to cyber deterrence.  He notes that even when the source of a cyber attack can be successfully 
disguised under a so-called false flag, and it’s not clear who the aggressor is, governments may 
still find themselves sufficiently entangled in symmetrically interdependent relationships that a 
major attack would be counterproductive.
36
 He gives the example of China and the United States, 
                                                 
34
 John B. Sheldon, “Achieving Mutual Comprehension,” Disarmament Forum Four (2011): 41. 
35
 Martin C Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=304894. 
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who are very often engaged in cyber disputes with one another but who are also increasingly 
interconnected, particularly economically.  China would itself lose from a cyber attack that 
severely damaged the U.S. economy, and vice versa.
37
 A reputation for offensive capability and a 
declared policy that keeps open the potential means of retaliation can help to reinforce 
deterrence.
38
  This thesis will explore this argument specifically with respect to China and the 
U.S., in Chapter Six.  
Defining rivalry   
Deterrence theory may be able to explain why rivals that frequently engage in cyber 
disputes with one another rarely or never escalate the level of attacks they are conducting. Rivals 
were selected by Valeriano and Maness because they are the most conflict prone actors in the 
international system upon whom much has been written and observed.
39
 Moreover, arms races 
and policies of deterrence do not exist between states that do not regard each other as 
adversaries. Rivalries are thus an excellent basis for exploring how and why cyber technology is 
being used in a hostile way.   
There is a good body of literature about rivalry and related concepts such as protracted 
conflict, which has generated a few commonly accepted and used definitions for what rivalry 
constitutes. Hensel draws on the work of other scholars to describe rivals as “two or more actors 
whose relations are characterized by disagreement or competition over some stakes that are 
viewed as important, where each perceives that the other poses a significant security threat, and 
where this competition and threat perception last for substantial periods of time".
40
  Hensel 
further explains that enduring rivals are those characterized as being involved in repeated 
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confrontations or crises, which helps to highlight the rivals' disagreement over important stakes 
and which contributes to each rival's perception of a security threat from the other.
41
 He gives 
examples of France and Germany through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan since 1947, and Israel and Syria 
since 1948. 
Hensel’s definition is similar to other scholars who do not define a rivalry based on the 
number and frequency of militarized disputes.  Vasquez argues that an adequate concept of 
rivalry must be able to predict when two states will have recurring disputes and not make the 
number of disputes a defining condition.
42
 He defines rivalry as “a relationship characterized by 
extreme competition and psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are 
governed primarily by their attitude toward each other rather than by the stakes at hand.”
43
  
Bennett uses an “issues approach” to understand when rivalries end.  For Bennett, rivalries end 
when the governments involved explicitly settle the issue that has driven the rivalry.
44
 He further 
describes rivalries as “long-term hostile relationships” in which one or both states occasionally 
use military force or the threat of it in an attempt to shift the resolution of the issues at stake in 
their favour.
45
 Thompson stresses the role of perception. His definition states that rivalry must be 
based on a state’s perception of which its principal enemy is, which means that he believes that 
principal rivals can exist without militarized disputes ever occurring.
46
 His work has some 
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similarity to that of Vasquez because both want to conceptualize rivalries in a way to be able to 
identify them before a crisis or conflict.
47
  
At the other end of the spectrum are those who put the number and frequency of 
militarized disputes or conflicts at the centre of their definition of a rivalry. Wayman and Jones 
identify enduring rivals as those who have had at least five reciprocated militarized disputes 
within 25 years. This builds on what Wayman described as a pattern of “enduring disputation” in 
an earlier study that sought to explain the effect of dispute escalation into war.  Goertz and Diehl 
offer a slightly different definition of enduring rivalries while utilizing the same criteria. For 
them, these are dyads that engage in six or more disputes over a 20-year span. Based on this 
definition they have identified two additional types of rivalry—isolated conflict and proto-
rivalry.
48
 Isolated conflict refers to a dyad that experiences one or two disputes, whereas a proto-
rivalry refers to those that have more than two disputes but do not fulfill the criteria for an 
enduring rivalry. These other forms of conflictual relationships may not be as severe or as 
protracted as full enduring rivalries, but they highlight the continuous nature of rivalry. Their 
sharply defined concept of rivalry has enabled Goertz and Diehl to develop a rivalry data set that 
is widely used by researchers and scholars, including this thesis.  
Hewitt articulates a “crisis density formula” for identifying rivalries. His definition of 
crisis is taken from the International Crisis Behaviour project, which applies three criteria to 
determine what a crisis is – leaders must perceive a heightened probability of military hostilities, 
a grave threat to national values and face either a shortened or finite time in which to make 










 A crisis-based rivalry is defined in terms of the frequency of crises between two 
states over a specified time period rather than full-fledged militarized interstate disputes (MID) 
which he feels has greater value because a rivalry relationship of mistrust can already exist in 
prior to a MID taking place.
50
 This approach results in a different understanding about when 
rivalries are initiated. It is a slightly broader way to envisage a rivalry than those approaches that 
only include militarized disputes.  
 It’s necessary to underpin any conceptualization of rivalry or protracted conflict with real 
data and for scholars in this field to be able to identify from where they base their inferences. 
There are four available datasets of rival dyads. Thompson’s dataset from 2000 was developed 
by looking at a historical record to determine which states see each other as their principal rival 
during a given period. The others were produced by Wayman and Jones in 1991 and Klein, 
Goertz and Diehl in 1992. The latter is the most commonly used and was updated in 2006 to 
reflect new information made available through the Correlates of War (COW) Project Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (MID) Data Set. 
51
 It is, as indicated earlier, the dataset from which this thesis 
has pulled its list of rival pairs.   
Rivalry behavior 
Rivalry between two states is dynamic and constantly changing.  Knowing more about 
the behavior of rivals, particularly with respect to how they engage in restraint, deterrence 
activities and at what point a conflict or crisis will escalate is instructive to inferring how cyber 
weapons are used in the context of a rivalry. Here, Diehl’s work in looking at arms races and 
conflict escalation is useful. Operating off of the understanding that an arms race does not 
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necessarily constitute a rivalry, he further finds that arms races alone do not substantially 
increase the escalation of militarized disputes to war between major power enduring rivals.
52
  
Further analysis reveals though that arms races do increase the risk of escalation to war but only 
when – among other factors - the adversaries have a history of recent militarized conflict.
53
 
Applied to cyber disputes, this means that a cyber arms race will not necessarily lead to a full-
blown cyber war unless the rivals have recently engaged in conflict. As they have never engaged 
in a direct military dispute, it would follow that their current cyber arms race will not lead to a 
full-blown cyber war.  
 Azar, although writing over 40 years ago, described inter-state interactions as having a 
range which the states involved perceive as normal. This normal relations range (NRR) is bound 
by two critical thresholds - an upper and a lower threshold.
54
 The upper critical threshold is that 
level of hostility above which any signals exhibited by either member of the interacting dyad are 
regarded as unacceptable to the other, and can imply that a crisis situation has set in. The lower 
critical threshold on the other hand is that level of friendliness beyond which signals between the 
members imply that some integrative shift in their relations-the inverse of a crisis-has occurred.
55
 Valeriano and Maness, in the research upon which this thesis takes its data, also discuss 
deterrence and restraint. They believe that restraint plays a “critical role” in the cyber realm.
56
 
They speculate that rivals will tolerate cyber combat operations if they do not cross a line, such 
as the destruction of the energy infrastructure of a state or infiltrations meant to take control of 
army units or facilities. This is because doing so would, in the context of a rivalry, lead directly 
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to war or retaliation.
57
  For the most part, rivals are operating within an NRR. Valeriano and 
Maness also point to the limits imposed by the need to avoid civilian harm as a factor 
contributing to restraint. While an initial attack may not have directly target civilians, the fall-out 
of the attack or retaliation could. This might manifest as critical infrastructure that is damaged 
and unable to operate, or havoc to global financial systems.
58
  
 Having reviewed the relevant literature on cyber warfare and rivalry, this thesis will next 
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
 
As set out in the Introduction, the primary research question that this thesis will answer is: 
what are the rivalry dynamics that cause a cyber interaction between two states? In the course of 
doing so this thesis will examine the following additional research questions: does the intensity 
of a rivalry between two states impact the likelihood of cyber ‘weapons’ being used? Do states 
only use cyber weapons against rivals who are economically weaker? Do states only use cyber 
weapons against rivals who are militarily weaker? Does the level of interconnectedness between 
two rival states impact the likelihood of cyber weapons being used? 
I argue that states are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival 
when:  
Hypothesis 1: The intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high;  
Hypothesis 2: When there is economic and/or military asymmetry within the dyad; 
Hypothesis 3: When the two rivals are interconnected through trade or bilateral 
agreements.  
 
The overall methodology of this thesis will be to conduct a regression analysis of data sets 
compiled by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness as part of their research on “The dynamics of 
cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001–11” against new independent variables.  Their 
research looked at 126 rival dyads in order to quantitatively examine how many of those dyads 
are actually using cyber technology in a hostile way against one another and how frequently they 
do so. They also tested theories of restraint and regionalism and discovered that the actual 
magnitude and pace of cyber interactions among rivals is not as great or frequent as might be 




Unit of analysis, case selection and time frame 
The unit of analysis for this thesis is a rival state dyad.  Of the 126 rival dyads that were 
considered by Valeriano and Maness only 20 had engaged in a cyber dispute or incident. There 
are 14 countries within the 20 rival dyads who have initiated an incident. They are China, 
Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Korea, Syria and the United States. There are another six countries that were victims but did not 
retaliate – Bangladesh, Estonia, Iraq, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The universe of cases 
for this thesis includes all of those 20 dyads that have experienced a cyber interaction (which I 
refer to as cyber dyads) as well as 57 other rival dyads that did not (referred to as non-cyber 
dyads). Among 30 of the non-cyber dyads, one of the two states is also a part of a cyber dyad. 
For example, Russia and Estonia are one dyad where there has been a cyber event. Russia and 
Canada are another dyad that did not experience a cyber event. This offers a potentially 
interesting basis for comparison – why was there use of cyber weapons in one dyad, but not in 
another? 
What is meant by a rival?  As outlined in Chapter Two, there are different ways of 
defining this term. Some maintain that military conflict, and a certain number of conflicts over a 
given amount of time is a necessary factor while others emphasize the role of perceptions. Since 
Valeriano and Maness based their dataset on the 2006 rivalry dataset compiled by Klein, Goertz 
and Diehl, their research and subsequently this thesis is limited to defining rivals in the same 
way that Klein, Goertz and Diehl do. As they explain, they regard rivalries as “possessing and 
varying across four constituent dimensions: (1) spatial consistency, (2) duration, (3) militarized 
competitiveness, and (4) linked conflict.”
59
 They exclude dyads that have experienced isolated 
conflict, and note that a rivalry relationship is one in which the military component of foreign 
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As already outlined in Chapter Two, there are some weaknesses with their definition. It 
does not allow for the role that perception can play in inter-state dynamics and places perhaps 
too much emphasis on the military dimension. Most of the rivalries included here also have an 
economic dimension, which I account for in some of the variables used to evaluate rivalry 
intensity and interconnectedness.  Yet the Klein, Goertz and Diehl data set is highly credible and 
widely used, providing a solid basis for this evaluation. 
The time frame for the cases is 2001 – 2011, as set out by the original researchers. They 
chose 2011 as the end point to allow for a lag time that would provide for extensive analysis of 
all cyber events.  In order to build out the data set, Valeriano and Maness employed the 
following methodology to find the relevant news stories and analysis of cyber incidents and 
disputes between rivals.  Using a Google News search query they entered ‘rival A’ (e.g. Iran) 
AND ‘rival B’ (e.g. Israel) AND ‘cyber’ OR ‘internet attack’ OR ‘infrastructure attack’ OR 
‘government attack.’ They were seeking the date and duration of the incident, who initiated the 
incident, the foreign policy objective of the initiator (disruption, theft, change the target state’s 
behavior), whether or not a third party was involved in the incident, whether or not there was an 
official government statement by the initiator about the incident (denial or acceptance), and the 
method and severity of the incident.  They note that in most cases sources were corroborated by 
multiple newspaper articles, blogs, and reports (coming from both think tanks and internet 
security firms), controlling for source validity and to avoid letting one perspective dictate a data 
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point. Each news story, report, or post utilized was carefully examined to ensure that the proper 
coding has taken place.
61
   
 As Valeriano and Maness admit, attribution can be a problematic issue and it’s easy to 
level the charge that their dataset may contain inaccuracies. 
62
 When attribution was in serious 
doubt, they did not include the incident or dispute in their dataset. They have also not included 
incidents or disputes involving anonymous hackers or operatives, seeking instead instances that 
are clear and explicit. They have considered the context of any alleged incident including the 
history of relations between the two states involved, noting that many incidents and disputes 
listed were corroborated with multiple news articles, blogs or reports. This thesis does not have 
the capacity to review the incidents and disputes they have listed to ensure their accuracy in the 
event of any new information being released subsequent to the conclusion of their research and 
will work from the information contained there.  
It should be acknowledged that by using the rival dyads as the unit of analysis, this thesis 
has two weaknesses. First, it overlooks the specific circumstances of each cyber incident or 
dispute, notably the details of which state was the initiator of the cyber interaction. Within some 
dyads like the U.S. and China there are both aggressors and victims. Within others, like Russia 
and Georgia, one state deployed the operation. Therefore the information collected about the 
dyads is unable to account for which state was in a position of economic or military superiority 
at the time of an attack, or if rivalry was especially intense at that moment. The decision to take 
this approach was done in order to allow for non-use dyads to also be included in the study.  This 
is important but comes at the cost of understanding the context of each instance of use. To 
remedy this, the thesis includes two case studies that delve deeper into specific incidents and 
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political context. As well, most of the variables – like trade flow, bilateral treaties, wealth and 
military expenditure – are relevant over the entire time frame under consideration and are 
unlikely to be substantially different at one point during the time frame. In addition, this 
approach potentially overlooks some states or other types of state-to-state relationships, 
including pairings that might be considered as rivals by other scholars.  The logic and merits of 
using rivalry as a selection device have already been explained – these are the most conflict 
prone actors in the international system and there is sufficient literature and studies available to 
guide predictions as to their behavior. In order to move forward with the development of a data 
set however, it was necessary to establish some basis for case selection. This thesis has chosen to 
not expand the cases to non-rivals for reasons of capacity but recognizes the value of doing so in 
future research.  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this thesis is a cyber interaction between two rival countries. A 
cyber interaction is either an incident or a dispute, two terms that Valeriano and Maness chose to 
use in lieu of ‘cyber attack.’  They deliberately chose to not use the term ‘cyber war’ either as 
they agree with Rid that cyber war is not about actual war where deaths result.
63
  Similarly, they 
also moved away from use of the term attack as they believe it is misguiding and inappropriate in 
that it sounds too similar to a conventional military attack.
64
  Instead, incidents and disputes have 
been adopted as their basic terminology and will also be utilized in this thesis, although at times I 
will say interaction or operation when referring to both types. They have defined cyber incidents 
as individual operations launched against a state. It may include multiple attacks or uses of a 
single weapon, but all as part of the same operation and conducted by the same perpetrator. They 
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used the example of Shady RAT, which was a five year operation that involved thousands of 
intrusions and affected over 70 parties including government departments of multiple countries, 
defense contractors and other private businesses. It would have been impossible for them to log 
each and every intrusion or act that was a component part of the broader operation so instead 
they logged the incident as a whole.
65
  Cyber disputes are specific campaigns between two states 
using cyber tactics during a particular time period and can contain one to several incidents, often 
including an initial engagement and responses.  For example, incidents such as GhostNet, Shady 
Rat, the Pentagon Raid, and the F-35 jet plan theft initiated by China against the United States 
and the US responses of Buckshot Yankee and Cisco Raider are all part of a single sustained 
cyber dispute between the two rivals in which China sought access to U.S. military 
information.
66
 The initiator of the dispute or incident is always from a government or 
government affiliate, although targets may be non-state if they are important to a state’s national 
security such as companies like Lockheed Martin or Mitsubishi. As already mentioned, the time 
frame in which these incidents take place is 2001 – 2011.  
Table 2.1 outlines the different activities and tools that comprise a cyber event. These are 
taken from Valeriano and Maness as based on definitions provided by other researchers such as 
Clarke, Knake and Reveron. These activities, as well as the software and tools that facilitate 
them, are what might be considered to constitute a cyber weapon although I must stress that there 
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Table 3.1 Commonly used cyber tactics and tools 
 
Name Description  
Website defacements or 
vandalism  
Structured query language (SQL) or cross-site scripting is used to deface 
or destroy the target’s web page. Generally these types of attacks have a 
propaganda element and are a form of control, suggesting to the target 
they lack the capability to control their cyberspace operations. 
Distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) methods 
Target websites, servers or routers are flooded with more requests for 
data than they can respond to or process and shut down as a result, which 
prevents access or usage.  Such attacks are coordinated through ‘botnets’ 
or ‘zombies’ which are  a network of computers that have been forced to 
operate on the commands of remote users. 
Intrusions  More targeted and severe than defacements or vandalism. They cause 
longer-term damage.  Occurs when unauthorized software added to a 
program to allow entry or future access to a site once it has been initially 
attacked.  They are difficult to detect and can remain dormant for a long 
time, and then propagate themselves without notice. The purpose of 
intrusions is usually to steal sensitive information from secured sites, 
which can have a destructive effect on a state’s national interests. 
Includes Trojans, trapdoors and backdoors.  
Infiltrations These penetrate targeted networks through a wider range of methods 
such as logic bombs, viruses, worms, packet sniffers, and keystroke. All 
of these five methods are highly precise attacks that seek out specific 
data or computers or networks to undertake tasks that they would 
normally not undertake. 
Advanced persistent threats 
(APTs) 
 
Include any of the four methods listed above but are highly sophisticated, 
customized and move very slowly so as to avoid detection. Examples 
include the Stuxnet worm or the Flame virus.  
 
Source: Valeriano and Maness, 2014.  
 
Independent variables 
This thesis considers three primary independent variables (IVs): rivalry intensity, military 
and economic asymmetry, and interconnectedness. Other variables include the possession of 





IV1: Rivalry intensity 
The first independent variable, intensity of rivalry within the dyad, has been included in 
order to determine if cyber events are more common among rivals with higher or lower levels of 
antagonism. My theory is that there exists a higher level of intensity among the cyber use dyads 
than among the non-use dyads because as intensity increases, so too does the level of 
antagonistic behavior and potential reasons to engage in a cyber incident or dispute.  
Intensity is calculated by looking at four distinct underlying variables, each of which 
relates to at least one of the elements that Klein, Goertz and Diehl utilize for determining the 
existence of a rivalry. Again, their four elements are spatial consistency, duration, militarized 
conflict, and linked conflict.  The four underlying variables that I’ve selected are described 
below. 
a) Existence of a territorial dispute in the post-1945 period  
A territorial dispute is an evidence of linked conflict; meaning that it represents conflict over an 
issue of mutual concern and importance. I have defined it to mean a circumstance where both 
states in the dyad lay claim to the same geographic area, whether land or sea. This may result in 
armed conflict or it may not escalate beyond angry political statements and claims. Some may 
involve additional states as claimants. The time frame has been chosen because of the significant 
border changes that have taken place since the end of the Second World War Most of the 
disputes identified have roots in border or land changes that go back several decades, which 
made it difficult to limit the time frame to match the time frame used for cyber cases and still 
account for the current impact of a lengthy and unresolved dispute. Data was sourced from the 
CIA Field Listings of Disputes.
67
 When more detail was needed I utilized a simple Google 
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search. If there were one or more such disputes within the dyad it was coded as one. If there were 
none, then it was coded as zero, meaning that the existence of a territorial dispute increases the 
overall intensity of the rivalry.  
b) Existence of a trade dispute  
Similar to territorial disputes, trade disputes represent linked conflict. It is also a way to ensure 
that rivalry intensity is based on factors beyond military ones. I used the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as a source of information about the existence of a trade dispute between 
two countries.
68
 I have included both direct disputes, in which one state is a claimant and the 
other a defendant, as well as indirect and third party disputes, provided that the two states are on 
opposite sides of the disagreement. I have also included cases which are still open as well as 
those which have been resolved. Coding is as follows: one if there was a trade dispute; zero if 
there was not. Again, this means that the existence of a trade dispute(s) increases rivalry 
intensity.  
c) Historic duration of the rivalry 
The history of a rivalry is an important factor in determining its intensity because it helps to 
distinguish between an isolated conflict and a dispute over a single issue versus a historic and on-
going antagonism between two countries. It is also one of the four elements used by Klein, 
Goertz and Diehl. I utilized the rivalry start and end dates included in their 2006 data set and 
calculated the duration of the rivalry in days. These were measured on a zero - one scale in 
which zero represents the shortest rivalries and one represents the longest, which means that for 
the purposes of this thesis, a longer rivalry is also a more intense one.  
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d) Number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) experienced by the dyad.   
MIDs were selected to substantiate the fourth of Klein, Goertz and Diehl’s elements - the 
existence of militarized conflict. They are defined as conflicts between states that do not escalate 
to full-scale war, which there are fewer than 1000 deaths, and some military force is used. The 
data for this was taken from Version 4 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data collection 
compiled by the Correlates of War Project (COW).
69
 A higher number of MIDs within a dyad is 
interpreted as contributing to the intensity of the overall rivalry.  
All four of the underlying variables were treated with equal weighting, and an average 
was taken across them to determine the overall intensity of each rivalry through four methods, in 
which the inclusion of the territorial dispute sub-variable was altered for three time frames: pre 
2001, 2001 – 2011, and since 1945. The fourth method did not include territorial dispute as an 
underlying variable.  
IV2: Military and economic asymmetry 
As noted earlier in this thesis, it is often said that what makes cyber operations attractive 
to states of all shapes and sizes are the relatively low costs and barriers to entry. The logic 
follows that it should be possible for states to attack larger or more powerful opponents using 
cyber technology. Yet what are the actual power differentials between states? I predict greater 
disparity between the cyber dyads than the non-cyber dyads represented by a high degree of 
economic and military asymmetry within the dyad.  
 In order to evaluate this, the thesis will take the average of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and the military expenditure for each state, in each dyad.  Data for GDP is sourced from 
the International Monetary Fund’s Economic Outlook Database (September 2011) in current 
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 Data for military expenditure is sourced from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute’s Military Expenditure Database in U.S. dollars at 2011 rates.
71
 It is not a 
reflection of what percentage of GDP is spent on defence and military, but is the actual spending. 
I then calculated the percentage difference in GDP and in military expenditure between the two 
states within the dyad, so as to determine the extent of asymmetry for each variable. The time 
frame for each measure is 2001 – 2011 so as to correspond with the overall timeframe that 
Valeriano and Maness considered. 
IV3: Interconnectedness  
The third independent variable is the level of interconnectedness between the two states 
in the dyad. I hypothesize that, higher levels of interconnectedness increase the likelihood of 
hostile cyber activity. This is because in spite of their economic or other closeness, these states 
are still rivals, seeking to find an advantage over the other. Yet conventional warfare or attacks, 
present challenges to pursuing those advantages and so a cyber operation, which is easier to hide 
and less physically damaging or morally unacceptable, presents a viable option.  
I have chosen to measure interconnectedness by looking at the trade relationships within 
the dyad and the number of bilateral treaty agreements between the two countries. Here I used 
data from the COW Trade Data Set, Version 3.0, created by Katherine Barbieri and Omar M.G. 
Keshk, specifically their dyadic trade data set.
72
  As with the rivalry and MID data sets, the trade 
information was arranged by COW country codes. I used these to search for each rival dyad and 
locate the amount, in US dollars, that each country within the dyad imports from the other each 
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year from 2001 – 2009, which is the last year included in the data set. These were averaged 
across the time frame and then a percentage difference was taken. It was important that the time 
frame corresponded as much as possible with 2001 – 2011 in order to explore the dynamics of 
trade relationships at a time when cyber events are also taking place. Trade interdependence was 
then determined by taking the sum of Country A’s trade dependence on Country B, and Country 
B’s trade dependence on Country A. It was also calculated in a second way - taking the sum of 
Country A’s trade dependence on Country B, and Country B’s trade dependence on Country A 
and scaling it to a minimum value of zero, and a maximum of one.  
  I used the World Treaty Index to research the number of bilateral treaties that exist 
within the dyad, by entering the name of each state and selecting ‘bilateral’ in the Laterality 
field.
73
 The Index provides access to over 55,000 treaties of the 20th century, from sources 
ranging from the United Nations Treaty Series to various national indexes, gazettes, and official 
files. I have only counted treaties from 1945 onward. I did not choose to limit the timeframe to 
2001 – 2009 for this variable because of the possibility that bilaterals concluded earlier are still 
relevant to current dynamics within the dyad.  
Other variables 
 There are three other variables included in the analysis which represent interesting facets 
of rivalry but are not expected to have significant explanatory power.   
The first of these pertains to regional dynamics. One of the learning points from 
Valeriano and Maness’ research was the realization that the majority of interstate cyber 
interactions takes place on a regional basis. Moreover, many of the policy instruments being 
developed by states in the area of cyber security are regional ones such as in Europe, Asia and 
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now Africa. While regionalism might not explain or cause use, the trend toward regionalism 
makes it a variable worth noting. I’ve defined regions as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa; East Asia 
and the Pacific; Europe and Eurasia; Middle East and North Africa; South and Central Asia; the 
Western Hemisphere and Other. If the two states within the dyad are in different global regions I 
coded a one; if they are the same then they were coded zero.  
Second, and somewhat related to the above, is if the two states within the dyad are of the 
same civilization type. Civilization type relates to Huntington’s theory that the primary source of 
conflict in the post-Cold War world will be ethnic and religious identity.
74
 It is included here so 
as to see if there are trends among users and non-users with respect to their civilization type. For 
example, are those dyads that have experienced a cyber event typically comprised of states from 
the same civilization type or not? I have used the following categories of civilizations, taken 
from an article by Henderson and Tucker and which are based on Huntington’s categories: 
African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox, Sinic, Western and 
Other.
75
  If the two states in the dyad are from the same civilization they received a score of zero, 
if they are from different ones than a code of one was assigned.  
Finally, the possession of nuclear weapons is pertinent as a variable because of the 
comparisons starting to be made between the cyber and nuclear sphere, particularly with respect 
to theories of deterrence and use, as explained in Chapter Two. It’s unlikely that simply having a 
nuclear arsenal will cause one state to launch a cyber attack on a rival, but since nuclear weapon 
states do have power and clout in international relations it could be speculated that they are more 
willing to engage in cyber activity as they fear retaliation less. I’ve used a Fact Sheet from the 
Arms Control Association, a Washington, D.C.-based think-tank, to verify nuclear versus non-
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 They include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
as well as India, Pakistan and Israel. The latter three are not members of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and Israel has never gone on record as admitting to possessing weapons but 
is believed to have them, by most of the international community. I’ve also chosen to designate 
North Korea as a nuclear weapon state for the purposes of this thesis. Coding for this variable is 
as follows: zero if neither state has nuclear weapons; one if one state within the dyad has nuclear 
weapons; two if both possess nuclear weapons.  
The diagram below provides a visual outline to understanding the variables just 
described.  
Diagram 3.1 Variables and hypotheses 
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Alternative theories or explanations 
The study of antagonistic cyber activity between states is a relatively new area of 
research and naturally there are other explanations that could be explored beyond what is 
included in this thesis. For example, one could argue that states initiate cyber operations because 
there are no real repercussions for doing so.  International law on this point is undefined, 
although rapidly becoming clearer in the area of cybercrime such as through the European 
Council’s Convention on Cybercrime.  Yet this is difficult to evaluate because in this theory, 
states are basing their actions on anticipated responses that could be rooted in past behaviour or 
current legal reality, but such an approach is a predictive and hypothetical one.  It might require a 
more general study of how states behave with respect to other issues of concern where there is no 
clear law or regulation to guide behaviour. Another factor that is worth exploring through 
additional research, and that builds on theories of deterrence and rationalism, would be what role 
alliances play in the decision to use a cyber technology against another state. The United States 
considered attacking Syria through cyber technologies in early 2013, for example, but did not do 
so. Were they concerned that Russia would counter attack in defense of Syria?
77
 Again, this 
might be difficult to prove because unless there are clear alliances with agreements that extend to 
cyber space, it’s largely speculative as to whether or not an ally would take retaliatory action.  
As mentioned in the Chapter Two, a lot has been written about the relatively low costs 
and barriers of entry as factors contributing to the growth of cyber warfare. It is true that much 
can be accomplished in cyber space by just a few individuals or a modest budget. For example, 
the incident against Estonia in 2007 was conducted using downloadable software and by 
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individuals that, mostly, lacked expertise in computer programming.
78
 The users of cyber 
weapons included in this thesis represent a broad range of wealth levels, as measured by GDP, 
yet by and large developing countries have yet to cultivate offensive cyber capabilities. There is 
a noticeable lack of African countries, for example, from among those known to have used cyber 
weapons although the African Union has recently adopted a Cyber Security Convention.
79
  
Finally, it might be argued that an international relations framework or a focus on states 
is not the best method for understanding the threats posed by cyber weapons.  A state-centric 
approach such as the one employed here could be deemed insufficient to understand and explain 
the complicated network of actors involved in any incident or attack; moreover the challenges of 
attribution could reduce the validity of the incidents and disputes presented here. It has been the 
case that an attack was attributed to a certain government, or undertaken by a network assumed 
to be affiliated to a government, only to have it later revealed that this was not the case. As noted 
earlier, Valeriano and Maness utilized a clear methodology in their process to develop the dataset 
and attribute attacks as accurately as possible with the understanding that any effort to build such 
a database is limited by the amount of information publicly available. My research has elected to 
use an international relations framework and approach because states continue to be the primary 
actors and decision makers in the international system, even as their role is changing. It is 
certainly true that cyber weapons impact and engage non-state actors to a high degree, but states 
continue to be the main players.  
 Having now outlined the methodology by which my hypotheses will be tested, the 
following chapter will present results.   
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Chapter Four – Results 
 
 A multi-variable regression analysis was performed on the new dataset that tested 77 
cases of interstate rival dyads against eleven distinct variables which were intended to prove 
three hypotheses. The cases included 20 dyads that had experienced a cyber incident or dispute – 
also referred to as a cyber interaction or operation - and 57 that had not. The rivals are all drawn 
from the Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006 rivalry data set. Data was not always available for every 
dyad – notably the gross domestic product (GDP) and military expenditure of North Korea and 
Cuba, and trade data for Vietnam.  
Overview of results  
 The results show that the three hypotheses fail to predict what causes a cyber interaction 
between rival states. Based on the samples used and data collected, there is no statistical 
correlation between a cyber interaction and either the intensity of the rivalry; the military and 
economic asymmetry between the rivals; or their interconnectedness. This was true in each of the 
three models tested. The first model excluded economic asymmetry (GDP), the second excluded 
military asymmetry (military expenditure) and third included both so as to account for 
collinearity.  
 Figure 4.1 outlines the odds ratios for each variable across three different models.  Odds 
ratios are the factors by which each variables increases the odds, or likelihood of a cyber 
interaction. The greater the number, the greater the probability of an interaction taking place. 
Asterisks are used to indicate odds ratios that are significant. The table also includes standard 
error (represented as S.e.), meaning the estimated standard deviation of error in the process 
employed. Rivalry intensity varied from an odds ratio of 4.52 to 6.28, depending on the model. 
This is a positive relationship but not statistically significant enough for it to be explanatory. The 
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odds ratio for economic asymmetry was nearly exactly the same in both of the models in which it 
was included (1.00 and 1.01 respectively), as was also true for military asymmetry (1.00 and 
0.99). Trade interdependence varied from 1.54 to 1.56.  
Apart from the main explanatory variables, the thesis looked at three others – regional 
difference, civilization difference and the possession of nuclear weapons by one or both states in 
the dyad.  It was found that there is no correlation between a cyber interaction and if the rivals 
are from the same region or of the same civilization. There is however an extremely strong 
relationship between a cyber activity and if one or both states in the dyad possess nuclear 
weapons. In fact, the odds of a cyber event within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear 
power are about 10 times greater than if neither does, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 
times greater. This result has implications for the debate referenced in Chapter Two, regarding 
the applicability of nuclear deterrence theory to cyber space as well as other lessons learned from 
the nuclear sphere.   These implications will be discussed in the following chapter after a closer 
look at trends and other observations from the other variables.   
These results are significant nonetheless because they allow us to begin to rule out certain 
assumptions and ideas and sharpen understanding around how, when and in what context cyber 
technology is being used, or is not being used. We have learned that these factors, expressed as 
variables, are not sufficient to account for use and know that we must look elsewhere for 
answers. In the process of testing the theories however, certain trends and patterns emerged that 








Figure 4.1: Predictors of cyber events among rival dyads 
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Hypothesis 1: States are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival 
when the intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high. 
 
I theorized that there would be a higher level of rivalry intensity among the cyber dyads than 
among the non-cyber dyads based on the assumption that as intensity increases, so too does the 
level of antagonistic behavior and potential reasons to engage in a cyber incident or dispute.  
As explained in Chapter Three, intensity was calculated by looking at four distinct underlying 
variables, each of which relates to at least one of the elements that Klein, Goertz and Diehl 
utilize for determining the existence of a rivalry. These four underlying variables are: the 
existence of a territorial dispute; the existence of a trade dispute; the duration of the conflict and 
the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) experienced by the dyad.  Each was scored 
on a zero - one scale and the average taken across all four in order to arrive at an overall intensity 
rating.   
 The analysis showed, overall, a positive relationship between rivalry intensity and cyber 
activity yet did not return a high enough probability level (approximately 5 percent) to establish 
a causal relationship. This suggests that this could be an avenue worth further study although 
perhaps through a different approach. For example, this could be to test rivalry on a ‘case by 
case’ basis and link it to intensity at the time of a cyber event, rather than trying to ascertain the 
level of rivalry over a ten year time period. Undoubtedly rivalry levels fluctuated in that time and 
the method used by this thesis did not allow for pinpointing exact moments of heightened rivalry 
and if those moments corresponded to a cyber event. The case studies that in Chapter Six will 
assist with providing some of this context. Each of the underlying variables could also be further 
refined to allow for more rigor in applying them – for example, I included and treated as equal 
any territorial dispute that had taken place since 1945 but it could be argued that some are more 
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contested, violent or intense than others and that a weighting system may have yielded different 
results.  
 A closer look at each variable is instructive and demonstrates that there is not a high 
degree of difference, across each variable, between the cyber and non-cyber dyads. For example, 
50 percent of the cyber dyads and 52 percent of the non-cyber dyads had reported a territorial 
dispute, an almost even divide. There was a slightly larger difference with respect to trade 
disputes where 20 percent of the cyber group had lodged a trade complaint against the other state 
in the in the dyad and only 11 percent of the non-cyber had.  
 The third underlying variable measured the duration of each dyad’s rivalry using the 
logic that a longer duration equals a higher intensity. As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the majority of 
cyber dyads have rivalries that are in the 50 – 74 year range whereas many of the non-cyber 
dyads have rivalries that are in the 2 – 24 year time range. It appears that there is a tendency for 
the cyber dyads to have longer standing rivalries. Significantly though, there are two non-cyber 
dyads whose rivalries have extended beyond 100 years. One of these is Russia-Japan, two 
countries that have each experienced cyber events separately, with other rivals, but not with one 






























# Cyber dyads 
(Total: 17) 
Percentage #Non-cyber 
dyads (Total: 77) 
 
Percentage 
Less than one 
year 
 0  0 % 0 0 % 
 2 – 24 years 4 23.5% 55 71% 
25 – 49 years 5 29.5 % 15 19% 
50  - 74 years 8 47 % 4 5% 
75 – 99 years 0 0 % 0 0 % 
100+ years 0 0 % 2 11 % 
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The number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) experienced by rivals varied from zero to a 
maximum of 50 (Russia – U.S.).  The results here are not dissimilar to duration. The clear 
majority of non-cyber dyads (61 percent) had not experienced a MID but a few (6 percent) had 
experienced a comparatively high number of MIDs, over 50. In contrast, there were more dyads 
on the whole that had experienced a MID among the cyber group but only one dyad of that group 
has experienced more than 50 MIDs. Therefore while the cyber dyads tended to have 
experienced more militarized interstate disputes on the whole, fewer of them had experienced an 
especially high number of them.   
 
Hypothesis 2: States are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival 
when there is economic and military asymmetry within the dyad. 
 
 My second hypothesis responded to statements about the asymmetrical nature of cyber 
warfare and its potential for power shifts despite the observation that the most active states in the 
cyber space continue to be economically developed and powerful countries. The analysis 
demonstrates that there is only around a one percent probability that asymmetry causes a cyber 
event to take place within a rival dyad however; meaning that asymmetry, on its own is not a 
sufficient explanation. There was not a larger disparity in either the GDP or military spending of 
the cyber dyads than among the non-cyber dyads. This suggests that states, on balance, are not 
placing strong emphasis on the relative economic or military strength of their rival. It should be 
pointed out however that the methodology employed did not allow for distinctions as to which 
state is the attacker and which is the victim – a role that, in some dyads, is interchangeable. 
Therefore it is not possible to say with certainty that the attacker is always stronger than the 
victim except in dyads where these roles are one-sided. 
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 There is one interesting result to note among the cyber dyad group.  Figure 4.1 outlines 
the differentials in GDP (blue) and military expenditure (red) among the cyber dyads. Military 
expenditure refers to actual spending, and not military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The 
majority of these dyads do not have large differentials and are fairly symmetrical. However the 
few exceptions that exist are extreme ones. Russia is an interesting case. There is a very large 
difference in the size of their economy and military spending as compared with both Estonia and 
Georgia, against whom they launched some of the most severe cyber operations on record. With 
the U.S., where there is a less extreme difference but still asymmetry, there have been multiple 
cyber interactions yet of a less severe nature, and with other rivals such as Canada, Turkey and 
Poland there is much less asymmetry and no recorded cyber events.  This could be an indication 
that Russia’s strategic decision-making places more emphasis on power differentials – perhaps in 
the context of potential for retaliation and likelihood of success - than that of other states. This 
would require a more multi-dimensional study than is within the capacity of this thesis. The only 
other extreme difference among the cyber group is between the U.S. and Syria which probably 
holds little significance, although last year – beyond the time frame of this thesis – the U.S. 


























Among the non-cyber dyads that were tested, the majority had only small differences of 
less than 10 percent for both GDP and military expenditure. Cases with extreme differences do 
exist but always involve a regional power such as Nigeria or a global super power such as the 
United States in which asymmetry is to be expected and extends to other measures.  These 
results were almost exactly consistent with the types of differentials found among the cyber 
dyads; therefore it it’s statistically clear economic and military asymmetry does not lead to a 
cyber event among rivals.  
There is a final point of discussion on this variable. Despite the lack of a positive 
correlation between asymmetry and cyber events, I believe that the findings related to nuclear 
weapons are somehow relevant here. Nuclear weapon states are among the most influential in the 
world albeit to varying degrees. The fact that they appear to be the most active offensive actors 
in cyber space – and frequently against one another – indicates that power matters. Power of 
course, can be defined many ways, but typically includes some measure for wealth, productivity 
or military strength which is why I believe that there is a relationship between these variables 
that is relevant to the finding on nuclear weapons and would benefit from additional research. 
The nuclear dimension will be further explored in the next chapter.  
 
Hypothesis 3: States are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival 
when the two rivals are interconnected through trade or bilateral agreements. 
 
The measurements for this variable included two underlying variables – the value of how much 
each state imports from the other, and the number of bilateral treaties that exist between the two 
countries in the dyad. As stated in the overview, there was not sufficient statistical evidence to 
indicate that the hypothesis is correct. There is a slightly higher level of interconnectedness 
between the dyads of the cyber group than in the non-cyber group but not one that is statistically 
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significant. Perhaps additional research or the use of other variables would reveal more 
information.  
That there is an increased level of interconnectedness via bilateral treaties is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. The x axis represents the number of dyads – 20 in the cyber group, and 75 in the non-
cyber group. 75 percent of the cyber dyads (15 dyads) share bilateral treaties, according to the 
World Treaty Index, whereas approximately only 49 percent of non-cyber dyads do, a significant 
difference.  Almost of half of those cyber dyads share more than 50 bilateral treaties; whereas 
those in the non-cyber group who have bilaterals do not tend to have very many between them. 
The only exception is the U.S. and Canada who share 393 treaties. 
Examining the amount of trade between the two countries within each dyad did not 
provide any insights. The method used to calculate trade was to identify the dollar amount that 
each country in the dyad imports from the other, and average that amount from 2001 – 2009, 
which is the last year of the trade data set from which this information was sourced. The sum 
was taken of each country’s dependence on the other to calculate dependency. The overall level 
of dependency across all dyads was extremely low, too low for this variable to have significance. 
The cyber dyad with the highest level is China-Vietnam. Among the non-cyber dyads, the 
majority had dependency levels that are also extremely low, albeit with a few exceptions: 
Taiwan-Japan, Russia-Ukraine, Iraq-UAE, Iran-Afghanistan, U.S.-Canada, Iraq-Saudi Arabia, 





















The thesis included three other variables – regional difference, civilization difference and 
the possession of nuclear weapons.   
The data shows that the majority of cyber dyads are from different civilizations but 
similar regions. Fifteen out of 20 of these dyads, or 75 percent, include two countries that 
represent different groups of the ten civilization types used in this study.  This is a strong 
majority that suggests that cyber activity takes place more often, or is more likely, among states 
of different cultures. The non-users were almost equally divided between being of different (49 
percent) or similar (51 percent) civilizations.  
Figure 4.3 helps to illustrate from which civilizations the countries included in the data 
set come from. Although some countries appear in more than one dyad per dyad grouping, each 
has been counted only once in this figure.  The most common groups among cyber dyads include 
Islamic and Sinic countries; among non-cyber, African, Islamic and Latin American ranked the 















The trend is reversed with respect to region. Valeriano and Maness noted that cyber activity is 
highly concentrated at the regional level. Eighty percent of the dyads in the cyber group were of 
the same geographic region. This is also true of non-cyber rivals though, which indicates less 
that rivals are more likely to use cyber tactics against a rival from the region and more that 
rivalry, on the whole, is a regional phenomenon. That said, certain regions are more represented 
among the cyber group while others are completely absent. Of the 20 countries that make up the 
cyber dyads, seven are from East Asia and the Pacific, and six from the Middle East and North 
Africa. There are none from Sub-Saharan Africa, and only one from the Western Hemisphere 
(the U.S.).  The non-cyber group is more mixed. It includes several African nations and several 
from the Western Hemisphere, notably South and Central America. The number of European 
actors remains low across both groups.  
 The most surprising result by far from the analysis was the discovery that there is a 
highly significant correlation between possessing nuclear weapons and the likelihood of a cyber 
event taking place between rivals. As noted at the start of this chapter, the odds of a cyber event 
within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear power are about 10 times greater than if 
neither does, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 times greater. The following chapter will 















Chapter Five – The Nuclear Variable 
 The regression analysis returned a surprising and potentially significant result. There is a 
very high correlation between dyads that include a nuclear weapon state and dyads have 
experienced a cyber dispute or incident. The odds of a cyber incident occurring when at least one 
state in the rival dyad is a nuclear power are about 10 times greater than if neither does, and if 
both are nuclear powers it is 80 times greater. Ninety per cent of the cyber dyads include a 
nuclear weapon state whereas only twenty-one percent of non-cyber dyads do. The possession of 
nuclear weapons by one or both of the states in each dyad was included as a variable in the 
analysis, in part as a factor somewhat analogous to the asymmetry variables and also because of 
the interest that some experts have taken in identifying parallels between the nuclear and cyber 
spheres. Ultimately, the nuclear variable offers the most explanatory power. 
Table 5.1 organizes the dyads from the cyber group by the number of nuclear weapon 
states within the dyad. It also shows how many cyber interactions (meaning either a cyber 
incident or a cyber dispute) have taken place within the dyad according to the original data set 
created by Valeriano and Maness. France and the United Kingdom are the only two nuclear 
weapon states that do not have an interaction attributed them per this research although both are 
























Both are nuclear weapon 
states 
# cyber events 
Iraq-Kuwait 1 North Korea -Japan 1 US - China 23 
South Korea-
Japan 
7 Russia - Georgia 4 US - North Korea 3 
  US - Iran 7 China - India 4 
  China - Japan 7   
  India - Bangladesh 1   
  China - Vietnam 2   
  US - Syria 1   
  China - Philippines 1   
  China - Taiwan 5   
  North Korea - South 
Korea 
11   
  Lebanon - Israel 2   
  Iran - Israel 11   
  India - Pakistan 13   
  US - Russia 3   















There does not appear to be any correlation between the number and/or frequency of 
cyber interactions and how many states in the dyad have nuclear weapons; meaning that there is 
not an increase in cyber activity when there are two nuclear weapon states as rivals rather than 
only one.  Interestingly, there does appear to be a positive correlation between which country in 
the dyad is the nuclear weapon state and which country is the initiator of a cyber event. While 
the data set for this thesis is not structured so as to allow for incident or dispute-level analysis, 
the original data set prepared by Valeriano and Maness is. For every incident or dispute that they 
logged, they identified its initiator (recognizing that attribution is always a challenge).  An 
examination reveals that frequently, the nuclear weapon state within the dyad is the initiator of 
the cyber event. There were 83 cyber events recorded in their research that took place between 
rival dyads in which only one country is a nuclear weapon state. In four of those events, the 
attack was attributed to both parties, leaving 79 interactions that had a clear initiator. Of those, 
67 (or 85 percent) were attributed to the nuclear weapon state.   
What are the implications of this result? Apart from significantly increasing the odds of a 
cyber dispute or incident occurring, what else can be inferred from the observation that nuclear 
weapon states are also the most active state actors in the cyber sphere? Does this denote causality 
or is it an intervening variable? 
It might be theorized that cyber weapons represent a less destructive, less morally 
reprehensible and overall more effective way to achieve important foreign policy goals than the 
using nuclear weapons. Yet this is too easy an explanation. It overlooks very basic differences 
between nuclear weapons and cyber weapons, however the latter is defined.  Nuclear hostilities 
pose an immediate and existential threat to humanity. Unless utilised to detonate a nuclear bomb, 
the destructive capacity of cyber technology is perhaps more comparable to biological or 
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chemical arms. As Martin Libicki of RAND Corporation has remarked, the destruction of cyber 
systems could return society to the economy of the 1990s, which would be a huge economic hit, 
but a major nuclear war would return us to the Stone Age.
80
 Similarly, nuclear explosions are 
unambiguous and immediate whereas cyber intrusions and actions may go unnoticed for quite 
some time. Herein lies the challenge for advocates of applying nuclear deterrence theory to the 
cyber sphere – many cyber operations are meant to be, or need to be, covert so as to be effective. 
As such, states may prefer to keep their cards close to their chests rather than advertize their 
offensive capacity, a striking difference from the nuclear sphere.  Another important difference is 
that it’s easier to distinguish between the civilian and military uses of nuclear weapons than with 
cyber. It’s been noted that nuclear weapons were developed in a purely military context whereas 
cyber technology springs from a civilian context; its militarization is what causes the controversy 
over its use, regulation and role.  
Moreover, cyber technology is being used to achieve objectives or targets that are 
relatively low impact.  Nuclear weapons have the opposite effect. In reviewing the 45 cyber 
disputes compiled by Valeriano and Maness, 28 of these (or 62 per cent) had the objective of 
“disruption” which means taking down websites or disrupting online activities. A nuclear bomb 
would accomplish these objectives – but also substantially more. Thirteen of the disputes had an 
objective of theft or espionage and only four sought behavioral change of the target. Those four 
disputes are a minority but it’s worth explaining their context because it reveals that as the stakes 
increase so too does the objective of the cyber operation. They are the 2008 Russo-Georgian 
War; the Olympic Games cyber dispute between the U.S. and Iran; a dispute between India and 
Bangladesh in 2010 and an on-going dispute between the U.S. and China.  
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A second inference that could be made is that cyber weapon states overlap with nuclear 
weapon states because both require a certain level of technological sophistication or resources. 
It’s been stated several times that cyber space and cyber weapons represent a cheaper and more 
accessible method to achieve foreign policy goals than conventional militaries and certainly 
nuclear weapons. This thesis takes the opposite position. While the asymmetry variable was not 
statistically significant, as explained in Chapter Four, the results relating to the nuclear variable 
do support the view of this thesis or, at the very least, support the nuance intended by Nye when 
he writes that, “Power diffusion does not equal power equalization. Large governments still have 
more resources. On the internet, all dogs are not equal.”
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 The most successful cyber operations 
such as Stuxnet still involved significant human and financial resources as well as sophisticated 
technology. Of course, it could be argued that not all nuclear weapon states, current or past, are 
necessarily wealthy. In some cases, regime or government type may have more to do with the 
state having a nuclear weapons programme or arsenal than simple GDP. An area for further 
research may be to explore the costs of several cyber operations and compare with nuclear, or 
other, weapons development.  
 A related consideration is if power or prestige will be conferred by having cyber weapons 
in the same way that has happened with possessing nuclear weapons. Will the same ‘old boys 
club’ of elites continue to dominate security discussions in the twenty-first century in the same 
way that they did in the twentieth? This will depend first and foremost on how important cyber 
space becomes to security and military doctrine. The United States considers it a ‘fifth domain’ 
along after air, land, sea and space and it’s certainly an issue gaining rapid traction within 
international and regional policy dialogues, as will be outlined in the final chapter of this thesis.  
Yet the majority of governments are more concerned with defensive capacity rather than 
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offensive which leads to a crucial point - in a networked world, traditional strengths quickly 
become vulnerabilities. For example, the United States and especially its military is highly 
reliant on computer networks, more so than possibly any other state. This means that the same 
cyber operation would have far more devastating consequences on the United States than on 
China or especially North Korea, described as a “cyber pygmy.”
82
 As well, the point that was 
already made about cyber weapons having developed out of a civilian context versus the military 
context of nuclear weapons development is relevant here too.  The extremely dual-use nature of 
cyber technology and its prevalence in other sectors means that it’s unlikely to become 
exclusively the domain of the military, implying that a greater range of actors have a stake and 
role to play in cyber space. It is therefore less likely to become an old boys club in the traditional 
sense; although this may just be replaced by a new grouping. If this should occur, then it could 
become a motivating factor for states to develop this capacity so as to share in that prestige.  
A final inference pertains to the future of cyber warfare.  If many cyber weapon states are 
also nuclear weapon states then it’s possible that they will seek to apply some of the same 
theories or strategies that they, and the international community, have used to avoid a nuclear 
attack, contain proliferation or reduce arsenals. Deterrence theory is a good example, as it’s 
accorded an important role in preventing nuclear war yet also stimulated an arms race. It’s not 
clear to what extent deterrence theory as developed in the nuclear context will become a feature 
in cyber space. The challenges of attribution are such that it’s not always clear who a 
government may be trying to deter from attacking. Moreover, there are a lot of questions 
surrounding what retaliation means in a cyber context and how it can be guaranteed.
83
 Cyber 
technology, when used as a weapon, takes many forms and its impact can be so specifically 
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tailored, that a standard reprisal or ‘one size fits all’ response may have the same power of 
deterrence as simply having a larger nuclear arsenal did. Libicki has written extensively on the 
merit of pursuing cyber deterrence policy and ultimately concludes that it’s problematic. In 
addition to the points raised above, he has raised other key questions that should be asked as part 
of determining if cyber deterrence will become a strategy of the future. They include the 
involvement of third parties, how to establish a threshold for response, what messages retaliation 




This chapter has explored the significance of the nuclear variable included in this thesis, 
which was ultimately the most significant in explaining what causes a cyber interaction between 
rival countries, or at least is highly linked to the likelihood of an attack, perhaps as an 
intervening variable. It has further explored the data and statistics pertaining to these dyads and 
offers the following observations:  
 The odds of a cyber event within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear power are 
about 10 times greater than if neither does, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 times 
greater. Hence, many nuclear weapon states are among the most active states in the cyber 
sphere. France and the United Kingdom are not recorded as being involved in a cyber 
event, per the original data set compiled by Valeriano and Maness.  
 
 There does not appear to be any correlation between a dyad having two nuclear weapon 
states and a higher number or frequency of cyber interactions than those with only one 
nuclear weapon state.  
 
 There does seem to be a positive correlation between which country in the dyad is the 
nuclear weapon state and which country is the initiator of a cyber interaction. In 85 
percent of the cases included the nuclear weapon state was the initiator of the cyber 
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This chapter has further explored potential implications of this finding:  
 
 Cyber weapons are not replacing nuclear weapons because they are more acceptable. 
There are significant differences between the two and moreover, the objectives and 
targets being sought after in cyber operations could not be accomplished by nuclear 
weapons, or vice versa.   
 
 The overlap between cyber active states and nuclear weapon states may relate to 
technological sophistication or wealth, although not every nuclear weapon state is 
economically well-developed.  
 
 It’s not yet clear if having cyber weapons will become a power symbol allowing a small 
group of countries to dominate security dialogues. A move away from the state-centric 
realist model towards a more open and liberal international order indicates that this will 
not be the case, as does the substantial role that non-state and non-military actors play in 
cyber space.  
 
 Deterrence theory, as developed in relation to nuclear weapons, cannot be applied 
wholesale to cyber space and does not need to be although it’s feasible that states may 
look to what they know and recognize from their nuclear history to make sense of cyber 


















Chapter Six – Case Studies 
 This chapter will present two brief case studies of rival dyads that have experienced a 
cyber dispute or incident. The first focuses on China and the United States and the second on 
China and Japan.   The objective in presenting these case studies is to delve deeper into the 
context surrounding inter-state cyber interactions in order to illustrate how states are using cyber 
space to advance various foreign policy or security objectives as well as demonstrate how the use 
of cyber tactics, in turn, impacts the rivalry dynamics of the dyad. Elements of these rivalries and 
their cyber behavior are connected to the ideas that underpin the theories argued in this thesis so 
that even while those theories have been ruled out, some of the fundamental thinking behind 
them is evident in the cases.  
 These two cases were selected because they represent differing levels of cyber activity 
and are geopolitically connected. China and the U.S. are by far the world’s most cyber-active 
dyad. The clear majority of incidents and disputes logged by Valeriano and Maness take place 
within this dyad. They are also locked in a highly significant political and economic rivalry that 
impacts international relations at a global and a regional level. China and Japan are fierce 
regional rivals between whom there have been some cyber interactions although not nearly as 
many as between the U.S. and China. In both dyads, there are important power shifts underway. 
In addition, the U.S. is Japan’s most important ally against China which adds an extra dimension 
of complexity to their cyber and non-cyber dynamics and, for the purpose of this thesis, helps to 
illustrate the intricacies of how states are using cyber space in pursuit of their objectives.  
 Each case study will follow a similar format. It will provide a brief summary of the 
overall nature of the relationship between the two states in the dyad. To be consistent with the 
analysis of the previous chapters, the summary will touch on the same variables – gross domestic 
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product (GDP), military spending, rivalry intensity, trade relationship, etc. – while providing 
some new information and commentary. The role of nuclear weapons and particularly the role of 
deterrence theory will be briefly discussed for each case.  The studies will then describe the 
nature of cyber activity between the two rivals – how many interactions, what their purpose is, 
impact and severity. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into a detailed account of each and 
every cyber interaction and also, it can be difficult to distinguish between unique operations. 
Some can be bundled as part of a single cyber campaign but particularly with China and the U.S., 
there is a high level of overlap between operations, and operations are complex. Hence the 
decision by Valeriano and Maness to distinguish between disputes and incidents.  Unlike 
previous chapters, terms like ‘cyber warfare’ and ‘attack’ may be used when they are reflective 
of the terminology being used by the country under consideration although the meaning of such 
terms is not universally agreed. The case studies will also explain how each state in the dyad 
approaches and defines cyber warfare, which is critical to understanding past and current 
behaviour as well as the prospects for future cooperation.  
Case study 1: China and the United States  
Rivalry dynamics 
The relationship between China and the United States could perhaps best be described as 
an uneasy balance of cooperation and competition, with each of those terms carrying more or 
less weight at different moments over the last half century. The crux of the rivalry, at least in 
recent years, is Chinese military and economic ascendance juxtaposed against what might be 
described as an irreversible decline in American power.  The potential implications of this power 
shift on international affairs has been studied and written about extensively by scholars, policy 
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experts and the media who largely agree that the China-U.S. relationship will be among one of 
the most important in the twenty-first century. 
This plays out at both regional and global levels where there is regular friction.  
American interventions in Asia, particularly in support of Taiwan and Japan, have long 
antagonized the Chinese who feel that the U.S. is interfering in their backyard. Globally, both are 
nuclear power states with permanent seats on the UN Security Council. China’s unwillingness to 
condemn North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean vessel the Cheonan in 2010 or the shelling 
of Yeonpyong Island that same year; and Beijing’s veto of UN Security Council resolutions 




Despite these differences, the two share connections that act as constraints on how far 
one state will antagonize the other – including in cyber space. The U.S. is China’s second largest 
export market, while China is third for the U.S. Two-way investment totaled more than $55 
billion in 2012.
86
 The World Treaty Index reports 54 bilateral agreements between the two 
nations and several other informal pledges exist, including some recent ones pertaining to 
climate and limiting the nuclear weapons programmes of Iran and North Korea. In 2013, the two 
states agreed to convene a working group on cyber security.
87
 Some feel that these ties are what 
hold the two superpowers back from engaging in a direct confrontation such as through a 
military strike or economic measures.  
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In terms of symmetry, the U.S. is still economically and militarily larger.  In 2013, the 
U.S. spent $640 billion USD in military expenditures which equals 3.8 percent of its GDP. China 
spent an estimated $188 billion USD, or 2.0 percent of its GDP on its military in the same year. 
However, China’s spending represents a 7.4 percent increase from 2012 while the U.S. is 
attempting to reduce its military budget.  It’s not clear how this difference will impact actual 
military capacity though. As will be discussed, much of China’s cyber activity has been premised 
on infiltrating U.S. defense contractors and military databases in order to extract information 
about, among other things, weapons development. This could enable China to ‘leapfrog’ over 
U.S. military capabilities although doing so, and maintaining an advantage, requires domestic 
expertise and technological capacity, among other things.  This corresponds with Nye Jr.’s 
theory of cyber power, as described in Chapter Two.  
The U.S. economy remains larger than China’s for now but that is predicted to shift in 
coming years.  The Chinese economy is growing much more rapidly than the U.S. is, at an 
annual rate of around seven percent (the U.S. economy is growing at only around two percent). 
The Economist predicts that China will re-emerge as the world’s largest economy in 2021 
although others believe that it could happen sooner, or that depending on the unit of 
measurement, it may have already happened.
88
 
China and the U.S. scored among the highest for rivalry intensity among all dyads 
included in this data set. This reflects the multiple trade disputes that have been registered at the 
WTO between them, the duration of their rivalry as well as the number of MIDs that have taken 
place between them (36). There was not a direct territorial dispute included, although American 
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support for territory claimed by its allies in the region against China certainly takes place but the 
methodology included only direct and not proxy disputes. 
Both China and the U.S. have nuclear weapons. Their dynamics in this regard are largely 
considered to be stable but are certainly an important component of their rivalry dynamics and 
thus impacted by other facets of their relationship.
89
 For example, China has a no first-use policy 
that acts as a positive confidence building measure yet on the other hand, has been rapidly 
modernizing their arsenal with the objective of arming their submarine fleet. These submarines 
could reach U.S. territory, such as Hawaii. China continues to be concerned about U.S. missile 
defence activities in the region. These activities are largely intended as defensive response to 
North Korea but the proximity to China has made its leaders uneasy. The American arsenal is 
vastly larger than the Chinese; they own approximately 4,804 nuclear warheads that include 
tactical, strategic and non-deployed weapons. China has around only 250 warheads in total.
90
 
This information provides the necessary context and backdrop for studying Chinese and 
American cyber activity. The two states are in a complex rivalry that includes both competition 
and the need to cooperate on issues of high importance. Their respective roles in the world are 
changing and that resonates on many levels and in many sectors. There is often disagreement and 
sometimes strong words between the two, although there have not been any direct confrontations 
during the time frame that this thesis covers. As will be shown in the next sub-section cyber 
activity is, particularly for the Chinese, rapidly becoming an ideal avenue through which to 
obtain valuable information and advance their goals for expansion. These activities are to the 
detriment of the United States however, who are primarily adopting an offensive posture in 
response although developing thorough defensive measures are critical.  
                                                 
89
 Poni Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward 
(Centre for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013). 
90
 Arms Control Association. 
70 
 
The cyber dimension 
In the cyber sphere, Chinese and American dynamics are largely characterized by the 
same patterns as in the kinetic world. There are regular, and increasing, levels of antagonistic 
cyber activity yet it seems to be maintained at a fairly constant (and so far mutually tolerated) 
intensity level.  There have been public statements of frustration by senior officials from both 
countries and it is recognized that this issue is becoming an ever larger bone of contention.  It is 
one of the issues that could send their relationship into a tail spin, according to one expert.
91
 The 
U.S. views China as “The most threatening actor in cyber space.”
92
 Some officials describe the 
current situation as reminiscent of the Cold War.
93
 This belief is not without merit. Many 
Chinese-sponsored cyber operations that have targeted the U.S. have been damaging in the sense 
that the information obtained was highly sensitive. In 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama put 
the issue of cyber espionage at the top of the U.S.-China agenda while administration officials 
warned of potential consequences if China continued cyber hacking to steal American 
intellectual property.
94
  Prominent former U.S. officials such as Dennis Blair and Jon Huntsman, 
as well as members of the U.S. Congress, have explicitly called for the imposition of sanctions 
on China for its use of cyber to gain economic advantage.
95
  
China however, sees itself as a victim of American cyber attacks. In addition, China 
believes that the U.S. has a stronger position in the cyber community because of its early role in 
pioneering and hosting the Internet. In 2011 it claimed to be the target of 34,000 cyber attacks 
from the United States.
96
 Such a large number seems unlikely, particularly as compared with the 
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counting system used in the data set, but likely reflects a definition of attack that includes single 
and specific activities whereas Valeriano and Maness used wider operations including many 
activities as their base unit. In 2013 the revelations about the American National Security 
Agency (NSA) surveillance by Edward Snowden somewhat undermined American credibility on 
the cyber issue though. It was revealed that the NSA had hacked into Tsinghua University in 
Beijing, which is home to one of six critical networks through which all of mainland China’s 
Internet traffic is routed including an important fibre-optic network for the Asia-Pacific region.
97
   
Valeriano and Maness identified five cyber disputes between the two countries in the 
2001 – 2011 timeframe and 22 smaller incidents that took place as part of those larger disputes.  
Again, it should be acknowledged that there are significant challenges with attributing operations 
and obtaining information about their implementation. This means that there could be other 
operations not included here or that the start and end dates are not accurate.  Yet their research 
goes a very long way in collating and organizing data about these interactions and allows for 
observations about the U.S. and China to be made.    
First, the majority of disputes and incidents (63 percent) had a severity level of two, out 
of a possible five. Two was coded to mean a “Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or 
military.”  None had a severity level of more than three, which would be defined as a “Dramatic 
effect on a country's specific strategy.” As such, it can be observed that cyber interactions 
between the U.S. and China are not very severe – although this is also true of most interactions 
included in the data set.  A second observation tells us more about the nature of the interactions. 
Sixty three percent, or 17 out of 27 interactions (which combines disputes and incidents), are 
labelled as an offensive strike. Nineteen percent are considered to be a nuisance; 11 percent are 
defensive operations and 7 percent combine nuisance, defensive and offensive elements.  This 
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shows that while many operations are bothersome, most others are quite literally, offensive. 
Valeriano and Maness only rated the objectives of disputes and not incidents. Among the five 
Chinese-American disputes in their data set, three were intended “to be disruptive” and two were 
undertaken for “theft and espionage”.  None were intended to induce a change in behavior.  The 
U.S. is recorded as the initiator of two of 27 cyber interactions.  
What do these incidents and disputes look like in reality? The five disputes included in 
the data set all include at least one incident. The largest dispute (“Chinese govt theft operations 
and US Response”) includes 14 incidents between 2003 and 2011, some of which are extremely 
high profile and presented a significant security dilemma for the U.S. government. They all 
involve espionage and theft. In 2006, for example, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) had to dispose of all of its computers after intrusive attacks that were 
traced to China.
98
  BIS is where export licenses for technology items to China are issued. Titan 
Rain is the name given to large-scale hacking operation attributed to a team of government 
sponsored researchers in Guangdong Province in China. The hackers stole information from 
military labs, NASA, the World Bank, and others.
99
 The 2009 revelation that defense contractors 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems had been penetrated and significant 
amounts of information relating to the development of the F-35 shocked many in both 
government and the defense industry. Hackers used software that encrypted the data as it was 
being stolen making it more difficult for investigators to discover exactly what had been taken. 
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Apparently they were in BAE Systems’ networks for 18 months before being discovered and 
were able to monitor online meetings and technical discussions.
100
 
Another category of disputes is referred to by Valeriano and Maness as “Chinese 
Defacements” and includes five incidents. One of these is the “Wolf defacement” in which the 
office computers of U.S. Congressman Fred Wolf were compromised by Chinese-government 




The Hainan Island incident in 2001 is one of the cyber incidents in the data set that is 
directly tied to a real world crisis between the two countries. It occurred in April 2001 when an 
American reconnaissance plane on an eavesdropping mission collided with a Chinese interceptor 
jet over the South China Sea. The Chinese jet crashed, and its pilot was killed, but the pilot of the 
American aircraft made an emergency landing at a Chinese base on Hainan Island, 15 miles from 
the mainland.
102
 The officers on board returned home within days, but the plane stayed behind. 
As the technology through which they had been eavesdropping was not properly destroyed by 
the officers before the landing, the Chinese were able to reverse-engineer the plane’s operating 
system which included an estimated thirty to fifty million lines of computer code supplied by the 
NSA. Doing this gave China a veritable road map for decrypting the Navy’s classified 
intelligence and operational data.
103
 The extent of this information grab only became apparent 
years later however; the immediate fall-out of the incident was more diplomatic in nature as the 
U.S. was pressured into issuing a letter of apology amid renewed debate about access to the 
airspace.  
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The two operations included in the data set which are U.S.-led are code named Cisco 
Raider and Buckshot Yankee. Cisco Raider enabled the U.S. and other states to halt counterfeit 
software coming in from China.  Buckshot Yankee was a defensive operation developed after an 
infected thumb drive was inserted into a U.S. military laptop on a base in the Middle East.
104
 The 
malware on the thumb drive, named Agent.btz, was able to replicate itself extensively and 
unobtrusively throughout the American military’s networks and even impacting NATO. When it 
was discovered it prompted a massive wake-up call and led to dramatic changes to how the U.S. 
structures its cyber policies.
105
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it’s not feasible to go into the details of each 
interaction as part of this case study.  Table 6.1 lists all the incidents and disputes between China 
and the United States identified in the Valeriano and Maness data set, and further indicates the 
initiator, severity level, objective and type of operation. What is important to take away from this 
information is that the majority of cyber interactions are Chinese-initiated. Most involve 
espionage or theft of information, some of it highly important to U.S. military and strategic 
interests. There have been some website defacements as well. There have not been any seriously 
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Table 6.1 Cyber incidents and disputes between China and Japan, 2001-2011 (Based on the 
























Name of dispute or incident 
*Disputes are bolded Date range Initiator Objective Severity Type
China-US 1 4/29/2001 - 5/1/2001 China Disruption (1) Minimal damage (1) Nuisance (1)
Hainan Island Incident 4/29/2001 - 5/1/2001 China Minimal damage (1) Nuisance (1)
Chinese govt theft operations 
and US Response 1/1/2003 - Ongoing China Theft (2)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific 
strategy (3)
Nuisance, defensive and 
offensive (7)
Titan Rain 1/1/2003 - 4/1/2006 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Shady RAT 8/1/2006 - 1/1/2010 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
State Dept theft 01/01/2006 - 7/7/2006 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
GhostNet 5/27/2007 - 8/1/2009 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Cisco Raider 2/29/2006 - 5/6/2010 U.S.
Dramatic effect on a country's specific 
strategy (3) Defensive operation (2)
2008 Campaign hack 8/1/2008 - 8/04/2008 China Minimal damage (1) Nuisance (1)
Night Dragon 11/1/2009 - 2/11/2011 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Commerce theft 11/1/2009 - 11/5/2009 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Buckshot Yankee 4/29/2010 - 5/1/2010 U.S. Minimal damage (1) Defensive operation (2)
Penatgon Raid 3/1/2011 - 3/10/2011 China
Dramatic effect on a country's specific 
strategy (3) Offensive strike (3)
F-35 plans stolen 3/29/2009 - 4/1/2009 China
Dramatic effect on a country's specific 
strategy (3) Offensive strike (3)
White House theft 11/7/2011 - 11/8/2011 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Seantor Nelson theft 3/1/2009 - 3/1/2009 China Minimal damage (1) Nuisance (1)
Byzantine series 10/30/2008 - 6/30/2011 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Nuisance (1)
Chinese Defacements 8/1/2006 - 12/5/2007 China Disruption (1) 
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) 
Nuisance, defensive and 
offensive (7)
Fred Wolf defacement 8/1/2006 - 8/1/2006 China Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
Commerce disable 10/1/2006 - 10/7/2006 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Naval War College disable 12/1/2006 - 12/07/2006 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Commerce Sec hack 12/1/2007 - 12/5/2007 China Minimal damage (1) Nuisance (1)
750,000 American zombies 3/1/2007 - 9/23/2010 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Aurora 6/1/2009 - 1/1/2010 China Theft (2)
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Google hacked and info stolen 6/1/2009 - 1/1/2010 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Htran 1/1/2010 - 2/1/2010 China Disruption (1) 
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Htran 1/1/2010 - 2/1/2010 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
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Perspectives and responses 
The Chinese view on cyber matters is different from the American perspective in a few 
key ways. First, China views “cyber security” as synonymous with “information security” which 
is a broader term that includes controlling the content of information available online, somewhat 
connected to issues of Internet freedom.
106
 The vast majority of Chinese actions in cyber space 
against other countries are done in pursuit of information, as demonstrated by some of the 
interactions described above. They seem to believe that the economic espionage they are 
conducting is within the range of acceptable behaviour between rivals; it is less about hostility 
and more about self-interest. The problem however is that the Chinese do not distinguish 
between industrial or economic espionage and espionage through which information critical to 
national security can be obtained.
107
 Needless to say, the U.S. does not agree with this point of 
view; President Obama once described it as the difference between stealing Apple’s intellectual 
property and trying to steal his talking points before speaking with the Japanese.
108
 Any of the 
espionage and hacking operations described in this chapter reinforces this point. One of the 
reasons why China is placing such emphasis on information collection stems from their concern 
about being too dependent on foreign technology and their desire to transition away from labor 
and energy intensive industrial sectors, which tend also to be high polluting. To do this, China 
has significantly increased its focus on science and technology. Investment in research and 
development, for example, has grown by almost 20 percent a year since 1999 and topped $160 
billion in 2012.
109
 Yet as Chinese leaders have reportedly been disappointed at the pace of 
domestic growth, they are looking further afield and for ways to shortcut the research and 
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development process. This has led to an expansion in their cyber espionage operations and 




Perhaps most relevant to the findings of this thesis is that China views cyber capability as 
having a strong deterring effect on its rivals, particularly the U.S. Its analysts have argued that, 
given U.S. vulnerability in this area and the potentially widespread impact of a cyber operation, 
the U.S. will be deterred from becoming involved in a regional conflict.
111
 It is speculated that 
this is why sometimes Chinese cyber operations are more obvious than at other times – it is 
being done intentionally and as a warning.
112
 An interesting avenue of further research would be 
determine if there is a correlation between these more noisy operations and moments where the 
U.S. is considering taking action on an contentious issue.  
 Where the two states are similar is in their response. Both have made cyber a top security 
priority and are rapidly developing their capacity in this arena, leading to concerns from others 
about a pending cyber arms race. In China, this is guided by a concept called informatization, 
somewhat akin to modernization in a time when information technology is pivotal.
113
 It’s 
difficult to know what this will look like in practice, as there are no formal articulations of 
Chinese cyber space policy.  Based on the writing of some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
analysts though, it can be surmised that China will seek to knock out an adversary’s command 
and control center through both cyber and kinetic attacks with follow-up attacks targeting 
communication, transportation and logistics networks to slow down the enemy.
114
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 The Americans are guided by a concept called equivalence. Essentially, equivalence 
means being able to retaliate through non-cyber (kinetic) means if the magnitude of the cyber 
attack on the U.S. should warrant it.
115
 It’s a way to navigate how threats shift between the cyber 
and non-cyber spheres as well maintaining freedom to maneuver. It’s also rooted in deterrence 
theory - by demonstrating sufficient capacity to retaliate, whether through malware or air strikes, 
a would-be attacker will theoretically hesitate to move forward. The problem with this approach 
is that deterrence is somewhat awkwardly applied to cyber space, as explained in Chapter Five. 
This approach also places a very heavy emphasis on offensive capability; the 2014 U.S. Air 
Force budget allocated significantly more resources to offensive than defensive capability which 
is highly problematic for a nation as networked as the United States is.
116
  This point also 
underscores the seriousness with which the U.S. military structures are now treating cyber space 
and their intention to establish dominance there. The U.S. was caught off guard several times in 
the early years of cyber warfare and is now determined to not let it happen again. The current 
plan involves four objectives: to treat cyberspace as an operational domain; to implement new 
security concepts to succeed in that domain; to build relationships with international partners; 
and to develop new talent to spur innovation in how the military might fight and win in this 
space.
117
 While offensive capability will be important, the U.S. is very vulnerable to attack and 
equal emphasis should be placed on defence.  
 Responsibility for the above rests with Cyber Command, otherwise known as 
CYBERCOM. Created in 2010, the body brings together all components of the U.S. military that 
work on cyber issues. It shares a director with the NSA and is growing rapidly in terms of 
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 This has raised some concerns about blurred lines of responsibility and 
accountability, although others worry that CYBERCOM is not distinct enough from the military. 
What will be important going forward is that there is an appropriate level of civilian involvement 
through transparent democratic processes and dialogue on the subject.
119
  
It’s less clear where within the Chinese government the responsibility for cyber 
operations are based. At least six different agencies and ministries – the Ministry of Public Security, 
State Encryption Bureau, State Secrets Bureau, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, and People’s Liberation Army – have input on cyber security policy. Very 
recently, in February 2014, China announced the first meeting of a leading group on “Internet 
security and informatization.” The group is chaired by President Xi Jinping, while Premier Li 
Keqiang and Liu Yunshan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the 
director of the Propaganda Department, serve as the group’s deputies.
120
 The formation of this group 
and its high-level composition sends a powerful signal about the importance that China attaches to 
cyber security.  
Beyond the Chinese government and military, and unlike in the U.S., non-state actors play an 
extremely active role in Chinese cyber operations. These are the cells and groups of hackers and 
software engineers whose precise connection to the Chinese government is not clear but are largely 
suspected of receiving support in order to carry out Chinese espionage operations. The security firm 
Mandiant has been studying these groups for several years; they refer to them as an ‘advanced 
persistent threat’ (APT), a term described in Chapter Three. In 2013 they released a groundbreaking 
report focusing on one such group, APT1, which is a single organization of operators that has 
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conducted cyber espionage campaigns against a broad range of victims since at least 2006.
121
  
Mandiant tracked APT1 back to four large networks in Shanghai, two of which are allocated directly 
to the Pudong New Area. They concluded that APT1 is likely government-sponsored and one of the 
most persistent of China’s cyber threat actors, capable of waging a long-running and extensive cyber 
espionage campaign through government support. Mandiant further discovered that the PLA’s Unit 
61398 is similar to APT1 in its mission, capabilities, and is located in the same area from which 
APT1 activity appears to originate – signs which further point to close connections with the Chinese 
government.  
 The non-state actor element is an interesting one that further complicates efforts at 
cooperation between the U.S. and China. In addition to the strong possibility of direct sponsorship, 
some experts describe other methods that the Chinese government has used to elicit support from 
these cells such as through propaganda and messaging. By deliberating painting a view of the world 
in which China is under constant attack from its enemies, the government has subliminally 
encouraged its citizens to voluntarily strike back through hacking or other cyber activities, which 
then becomes an act of patriotism rather than criminal activity.
122
 It’s extremely difficult to know 
how many such actors exist within China or to what extent they are affiliated with authorities and 
what level of control authorities have. This will continue to be a complicating factor for any effort to 
regulate activity in cyber space. 
 It’s difficult to know to what extent the nuclear capabilities of either nation factor into the 
strategic thinking on cyber. Both states have indicated that kinetic attacks play a role in their 
cyber policies and that the ability to deter their enemies involves kinetic capabilities alongside 
cyber ones. Of course, this does not explicitly mean nuclear weapons and it is hoped that almost 
70 years of non-use of nuclear weapons won’t be broken now in the context of a cyber operation.  
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The Chinese arsenal is significantly smaller than the American but they have been modernizing 
and expanding with the aim of being fully capable on land, sea and air. The fact that both are 
nuclear powers gives rise to at least one interesting question – would the severity of the cyber 
interactions between these two countries be more severe if the other was not a nuclear weapon 
state? Of course, the same could also be asked about military capacity and economic strength in 
general, and if relative power is what has kept the situation stable so far. The second case study 
on China and Japan will demonstrate different dynamics in the severity and nature of cyber 
interactions.  
Summary 
 This brief look at the cyber and non-cyber relationship between China and the United 
States has generated the following observations. Both states seek dominance and strength in the 
cyber domain, as an extension of their power in the non-cyber world and in response to their own 
perception of being a victim of the attacks of the other. They are investing significant financial 
and human resources in pursuit of this goal. The American framework for cyber policy and 
operations is more clearly defined than the Chinese, and with China there is a high level of 
activity among non-state actors.  The U.S. is the more vulnerable of the two nations and the 
Chinese are aware of and seek to exploit this. For the most part, Chinese cyber operations have 
focused on theft and espionage with no distinction between private industry and matters of U.S. 
national security. Frustration has been publicly expressed by both countries yet neither has 
responded with a show of strength that would dramatically escalate their competition. Overall, 
tension in the cyber sphere is becoming a complicating factor in their rivalry, a rivalry with 
significant implications for the international landscape.  
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 The above conditions would indicate that the two states are on a cyber collision course. 
Yet there are strong incentives for them to cooperate as much as possible. These are rooted as 
much in their economic relationship as well as in rational interests in preserving peace. While not 
perfect equals, both are sufficiently balanced in strength and influence that the fall-out of full-
blown conflict, whether on cyber or other issues of contention, is itself a powerful deterrent. The 
Working Group established by the two countries in 2013 creates a positive forum for this but it’s 
yet to be seen what the outputs will be.  
Case Study 2: China and Japan 
Rivalry dynamics 
The relationship between China and Japan is an important one both within the Asian 
region and globally.  It is a rivalry with deep historic roots and one that closely involves China’s 
primary adversary, the United States. Throughout history Japan has been strongly influenced by 
China in its language, architecture, culture, religion, philosophy, and law. Their power dynamics 
have typically been clear cut, with one country always being more prosperous or powerful than 
the other. Prior to the nineteenth century, China was usually dominant but following the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868 and the move to modernization, Japan has generally been preeminent.
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Since the end of the Second World War, their relationship has waxed and waned in tandem with 
the rise and fall of each country’s economic strength and political clout. It has only been in more 
recent years that the two have reached a sort of parity – albeit with the important distinction that 
China's economy and influence have grown rapidly, and will likely to continue to do so, while 
Japan's are becoming stagnant.
124
 Yet both are among the strongest economies in the world and 
certainly in the Asian region. The two account for nearly three-quarters of the region's economic 
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 They have a deep history of being significant trading partners although political 
disputes, most recently in 2012, have interfered with that. Following Japanese nationalization of 
disputed island in East China Sea trade, for example, China boycotted Japanese goods leading to 
a 13.8 per cent plunge in Japanese exports to China.
126
 It is predicted that trade relations will 
return to normal as of 2014 but it’s entirely possible that another political incident could 
challenge that.  
The military dimension of their rivalry is unique, notably because of the involvement of 
the U.S. In many ways, China is by far the stronger military power. They possess nuclear 
weapons and have the second highest military budget in the world.  Japan has had a ‘peace 
constitution’ since the end of World War II (WWII) in which they renounced the right to wage 
war. That constitution, which also enacted a parliamentary system, replaced the militaristic and 
monarchist system. To ensure its protection however, Japan and the U.S. signed the Mutual 
Security Treaty in 1951, which was updated in 1960.  In exchange for protection the U.S. was 
permitted to establish military bases in the Japanese archipelago. This gave the Americans an 
additional toe-hold in the region, an aggravating factor for the Chinese. The alliance has been the 
pillar of U.S. policy in the Pacific for over half a century.
127
  
In 2012, Japan turned an important corner when Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime 
Minister, announced his intention to increase Japanese military spending. In August 2014, the 
Japanese defence ministry made a record budget request of 5.5 trillion yen ($53 billion USD) 
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making it the third year in a row that saw a rise in Japanese military spending.
128
 The defence 
build-up is said to be aimed at deterring an attack on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands claimed by 
both China and Japan.
129
  Japan has also recently relaxed its ban on arms exports. These moves 
have made waves across the region, where fears of Japanese re-militarization loom large.
130
 It 
has particular meaning for the Chinese.  As one expert explains, “The War of Resistance Against 
Japan, as the Chinese call their version of World War II, lasted more than twice as long as 
Japan's conflict with the United States; it had already been raging for more than four years when 
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. By the time the war ended, it had caused far more casualties and 
atrocities than had the bitter struggle between Japan and the United States.”
131
  
Territorial disputes are an important facet of the China – Japan rivalry. As touched on 
above, the two countries disagree over the sovereignty of a cluster of islets, known as Senkaku in 
Japanese or Diaoyu in Chinese. Japan currently has administrative control over the islands and 
does not recognize the existence of a dispute over the islands.
132
 The dispute is rooted in energy 
reserves reported to be beneath these islands which could become an important and badly needed 
source of ‘domestic’ reserves.
133
 The last few years have seen the dispute flare up as a result of 
moves from both parties. In 2010, China accused Japan of changing their agreed status quo on 
the region when they arrested a Chinese fishing vessel captain after the vessel rammed a 
Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the islands. China sees the Japanese Government's purchase of 
some of the islands from their private owner in 2012 as a provocative action, while Japan is 
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frustrated with China’s announcement of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that 
includes the air space above the island.
134
 
A final dimension of the rivalry that is important to highlight pertains to the cultural 
relationship between the Chinese and Japanese people. There has been increasing animosity 
between Japanese and Chinese people in recent years. A 2014 BBC World Service Poll showed 
that only three percent of Japanese people view China's influence positively, with 73 percent 
expressing a negative view of it. Meanwhile, only five percent of Chinese people view Japanese 
influence positively, with 90 percent expressing a negative view – which is the most negative 
perception of Japan in the world.
135
 
The paragraphs above have described different elements of the rivalry between China and 
Japan, touching on many of the same variables used by this thesis. This includes economic and 
military strength, their trade relationship, territorial disputes, possession of nuclear weapons by 
China and cultural issues. It’s clear that they are from the same region. With respect to the other 
variables, there are 45 bilateral treaties between China and Japan according the World Treaty 
Index. There are three very recent trade disputes registered with the WTO, although two have 
been resolved. The MID dataset records only seven disputes between the two.  MIDs are non-
cyber. There are other issues of contention within the rivalry, such as the Korean peninsula and 
Taiwan, which continue to complicate the relationship. In both of those issues the U.S. plays a 
role.  
The cyber dimension 
 The cyber dynamic between China and Japan is different than the one between China and 
the U.S., reflecting the different nature of each rivalry. There are fewer (known) incidents and 
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disputes and so far, it’s been entirely one-sided. Japan is not known to have initiated any hostile 
cyber operations against other countries and there are none included in this data set, although 
there have been allegations from China and South Korea of Japanese-led operations. Several of 
the Chinese operations against the Japanese are a direct retaliation for perceived slights and 
affronts in the kinetic, non-cyber world. In this respect, China has used cyber technology in a 
more ‘weapon-like’ way against Japan than it has against the U.S., although it also uses it in 



















Name of dispute or incident 
*Disputes are bolded Date range Initiator Objective Severity Type
Htran 1/1/2001 - 2/1/2001 China
Disruption 
(1) 
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Htran 1/1/2001 - 2/1/2001 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
WWII Memorial 1/6/2005 - 5/15/2005 China
Disruption 
(1) Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
WWII Memorial 1/6/2005 - 5/15/2005 China Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
Hack and extort 12/27/2007 - 6/1/2008 China Theft (2)
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Hack and extort 12/27/2007 - 6/1/2008 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Earthquake hack 3/11/2010 - 3/14/2010 China Theft (2)
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
Earthquake hack 3/11/2010 - 3/14/2010 China
Targeted attacked on critical 
infrastructure or military (2) Offensive strike (3)
East China Sea Dispute 09/14/2010 - 9/17/2010 China
Disruption 
(1) Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
East China Sea Dispute 09/14/2010 - 9/17/2010 China Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
Mitsibishi Hack 09/01/2011 - 11/4/2011 China Theft (2)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific 
strategy (3) Offensive strike (3)
Mitsibishi Hack 09/01/2011 - 11/4/2011 China
Dramatic effect on a country's specific 
strategy (3) Offensive strike (3)
Parliament Hack 10/25/2011 - 11/2/2011 China
Disruption 
(1) Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
Parliament Hack 10/25/2011 - 11/2/2011 China Minimal damage (1) Offensive strike (3)
Table 6.2 Cyber incidents and disputes between China and Japan, 2001-2011 (Based on the 
























The data set includes seven cyber disputes between China and Japan during 2001 and 
2011. Each dispute has only one incident tied to it, meaning that the two types of interactions 
have been bundled together.  The objective of four of those interactions was disruption, while 
three was to steal sensitive information or strategies – a near even split. All are classified as an 
offensive strike by Valeriano and Maness and none as a nuisance, which is an important 
difference from the China-U.S. interactions. It’s demonstrates more aggression as well as 
consistency in purpose. In terms of severity, one interaction (the Mitsubishi hack) was rated a 
three, meaning that the impact of the operation was a ‘dramatic effect on a country’s specific 
strategy’ while the other interactions were evenly divided between rankings of one (‘minimal 
damage’) and two (‘targeted attack on critical infrastructure or military’).  As with the previous 
case study, these details have been outlined in Table 6.2. It’s difficult to notice trends with so 
few cases and also where the ratings for each variable are distributed more or less equally across 
their respective scales.  
 As stated above, some of these operations appear to be direct retaliation for actions 
undertaken by Japanese government officials. For example, in 2004, Chinese hackers connected 
to the China Federation of Defending Diaoyu Islands attacked multiple Japanese websites.
136
 
They stated that this was in response to Japanese cyber operations against a pro-Chinese website 
although there is little available evidence to support that.  Similar operations occurred in 2010 
and are noted in the data set. One came on the heels of the fishing vessel incident described 
earlier in this chapter and the second took place amidst the chaos induced by the earthquake and 
while tensions with China were still very high as a result of the dispute over the islands. The first 
incident involved a denial of service operation that made it virtually impossible to access defence 
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ministry and national police agency websites. In the second operation, ‘trapdoors’ were sent via 
email to Japanese government and private websites leading to the theft of critical information. 
There have been multiple operations that are related to a Japanese World War II memorial 
considered offensive by the Chinese as it includes the names of the fallen from Japan's wars, 
including 14 convicted Class A war criminals.  For example (and not included in the data set), is 
a 2001 attack from hackers linked to the Honkers Union of China that targeted the servers of 
multiple Japanese agencies. The hackers simultaneously issued statements criticizing the visit of 
then-Prime Minister Koizumi to the shrine. When the Prime Minister visited the site again in 
2005, Chinese hackers tried to deface Japanese government websites.
137
 
 In addition to illustrating the retaliatory and more overtly hostile nature of some Chinese 
operations against Japan, the above examples demonstrate the role that non-state actors and so-
called ‘hacktivists’ play in the China context as mentioned in the previous case study.  They also 
show that actions in cyber space very closely align with the same issues that are central to this 
rivalry – in particular, territorial disputes and lingering tension from WWII and Japan’s 
militaristic past.  
 The interactions aimed at theft and espionage took place between 2008 and 2011. The 
most notorious is known as the Mitsubishi hack of 2011. Around 80 virus-infected computers 
were found at the Mitsubishi’s headquarters in Tokyo as well as at manufacturing and research 
and development sites. At least eight different kinds of computer viruses including Trojan horses 
were identified.
138
 Information relating to the design of weapons such as surface-to-air Patriot 
missiles and AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles as well as highly sophisticated submarines was 
compromised by the operation.   








 Only one month after the Mitsubishi hacking operation was discovered, the personal 
computers of three representatives in Japan’s lower house of Parliament and a server were found 
to have been infected by viruses.
139
 Researchers discovered that one of the screens used to begin 
the attacks was written in the simplified Chinese characters used in mainland China, although no 
formal allegation was made. China denied any involvement. Following the discovery of these 
two operations, the Japanese government began to take the external threat of cyber security far 
more seriously.  
Perspectives and responses 
 The previous case study described the Chinese perspective and approach to cyber 
security. Rather than repeat that information, this section will focus mostly on how Japan has 
responded to the cyber threats they’ve encountered while also outlining various efforts at 
regional cooperation.  
 Japan’s response to antagonistic cyber behavior has been slow but, similar to many other 
nations, is rapidly becoming a national security priority. For much of the last two decades, the 
country had focused on domestic problems of cyber crime and improving the security of 
computerized networks both within government and especially in private industry. Like the 
American experience with the emergence of the Internet, the military has only recently become 
involved and cyber security has largely been connected to commercial interests. There was for 
many years a tension between government efforts to introduce regulations that aimed to provide 
security and a liberal business culture.
140
  
 This changed with the Mitsubishi and Parliament attacks, prompting the government to 
take more decisive action to protect its businesses and own offices and departments from 
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international attackers. In March 2012 the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) of 
Japan and eight Japanese electronics companies established a “Control System Security Center 
(CSSC).” CSSC is a technology research association designed to strengthen the security of 
control systems of important infrastructure and to establish verification methods and evaluation 
of control systems.
141
 In collaboration with eighteen companies including manufacturers, 
vendors, and consumers of control systems, the CSSC opened a test-bed laboratory for the 
security of control systems in Miyagi, Tohoku on May 17, 2013. The lab has several objectives: 
1) to provide the latest security verification tools for controls systems, 2) to develop secure 
technology for control systems, 3) to drive international system security standardization, 4) to 
develop certification tools, 5) to provide incident support, 6) to develop human resources, and 7) 
to establish security guidelines.
142
 
 There has been speculation as to whether or not Japan is developing an offensive cyber 
capability. What is known is that the Japanese are developing automated software meant to 
identify and disable the botnets usually involved in espionage and theft operations.
143
 
Technically, this constitutes malware and could be viewed by some as a weapon, even if it’s 
intended as a counter measure. This is controversial for the Japanese because so far, offensive 
actions in cyber space also fall under the purview of the peace constitution. Therefore being able 
to legally deploy this software even in self-defense would require significant changes to the 
constitution. Bearing in mind other changes in the Japanese approach to defense – increased 
spending, the relaxation of their arms export ban – it becomes evident that the cyber security 
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measures described above are occurring in a time of fundamental change in Japanese defense 
policy and what could be a new era of self-reliance.  
 What could that mean for the China-Japan rivalry, or for the American-Japanese security 
alliance? It could lead to increased hostile operations from the Chinese or, depending on where 
Japanese cyber capability goes, and the extent to which the Chinese apply their theories of 
deterrence to their own actions, deter them. The fact that several of the known cyber interactions 
against Japan mirror conflict outside of cyber space is worrisome. At the moment, Japan has 
cyber-related agreements in place with both China and the U.S., although each is different in 
nature. The agreement with China also includes South Korea and is a confidence building 
measure among the region. The 2005 China-Japan-South Korea (CJK) agreement created links 
between the Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) operating in each country and has 
facilitated information sharing, procedures for handling attacks, and developing approaches for 
decreasing the likelihood of retaliation.
144
 While the agreement was a positive step forward it 
evidently has not gone far enough to prevent further operations between the neighbors.  
 A Japan with enhanced cyber capabilities would be a boost for American defenses 
against China. The allies have made it clear through a series of public statements over the last 
two years that cyber security is “also an important line of effort in the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
ensuring that our practices, our standards, our procedures are as strong and robust as they can be, 
because that’s the thing – that’s the foundation for everything else that we do together.”
145
 At the 
same time, a more independent Japan that is less reliant on American protection could alter this.  
Part of the protection that Japan enjoys from the U.S. is being under its nuclear umbrella. As 
                                                 
144
 Ito, Rattray, and Shank 248.  
145
 “Defense.gov Transcript: Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on the 2+2 Joint 




with the other case study, there is no way to know exactly how nuclear weapons possession 
factors into decisions on cyber operations. What can be observed is that the attacks on Japan 
included in the data set have tended to be more aggressive and closely connected to real world 
rivalry dynamics and politics than those against the United States.  
Summary  
This case study has briefly reviewed the nature of the rivalry between China and Japan. 
This is a rivalry with a deep history that has sustained many power shifts between the two 
countries. Currently China is the stronger country but Japan is not far behind at all, especially in 
terms of economic strength. It has taken some assertive steps in terms of its defense policies. Key 
issues between the two countries include territorial disputes over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands 
which is rooted in their respective energy needs; North Korea, and Taiwan. Japan enjoys the 
military protection of the U.S., which is China’s primary global rival, adding an extra layer of 
complexity to the dynamics. There are seven cyber interactions in the data set between China and 
Japan, all of them initiated by China. Their severity, on average, is higher than the severity of 
interactions between China and the U.S. Several of these cyber incidents are directly correlated 
to non-cyber incidents considered provocative by the Chinese, such as the seizure of disputed 
territory or high level visits to a controversial war memorial. It’s extremely interesting to note 
that on those occasions the response from China was through cyber means; it leads to the 
inference that in some instances they are actually using cyber technology as a weapon. In 
response, Japan has only recently prioritized cyber security and is also exploring the 
development of a malware system that could be deployed for self-defense purposes, although 
there are legal limitations to their ability to do so.  China and Japan, along with South Korea, 
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share a cyber security pact; meanwhile the U.S. and Japan have very recently affirmed that their 
partnership extends to the cyber sphere.  
Throughout this chapter there have been allusions to different patterns of behavior 
emerging between the two dyads. Comparing the two cases generates some observations and 





















Chapter Seven – Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
In this thesis, I argued that a state is most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident 
against a rival when the intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high; when there is 
economic and military asymmetry within the dyad; and when the two rivals are interconnected 
through trade or bilateral agreements. These theories are based on what is known about how 
cyber technology has been used to date as a ‘weapon’ and also about the behavior of rival states. 
A multi-variable regression analysis was performed on a dataset that tested 77 cases of 
interstate rival dyads against eleven distinct variables that were intended to prove three 
hypotheses. The cases included 20 dyads that had experienced a cyber incident or dispute – also 
referred to as a cyber interaction - and 57 that had not. Two case studies were included as well 
that focused on China and the United States, and China and Japan, as rival dyads that have 
experienced differing levels of cyber activity.  
The results of the analysis show that the three hypotheses do not predict what causes a 
cyber event between rival states. Based on the data collected however, there are some important 
trends and observations to highlight:  
- The relationship between rivalry intensity, as measured here and the occurrence of cyber 
activity between rivals is not significant enough to explain why states initiate cyber 
operations against one another. There is a very slight positive relationship between the 
two but nothing substantive enough for it to be explanatory.  A suggested area for further 
research on this variable is to examine if intensity within a rivalry was heightened at 
moments when a cyber operation was initiated by one of the rivals such as seen with 
China and Japan; acknowledging the constraints imposed by access to information and 
attribution.  
 
- The asymmetry variable fails to explain why states engage in cyber interactions. A 
different methodology may produce different results however. By taking the percentage 
difference between the average GDP and average military expenditure of each state in the 
dyad, averaged over a ten year time frame, the approach used by this thesis did not take 
into account  which state in the dyad initiated an operation(s), if both did, and if that is 




- There are more cyber interactions between rivals that are of different civilization type. 
Countries that are identified as Islamic and Sinic are the most cyber active among all nine 
types. 
 
- The analysis confirmed the regional trend highlighted in the original Valeriano and 
Maness data set. Most cyber active dyads are within the same region, with an emphasis 
on Asia and the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This raises questions about why 
there was little or no inter-state cyber activity in other regions during the time frame 
considered.  For example, are there certain pre-requisites for these types of operations 
that are more prevalent in Asia and MENA?  
 
- There is a very slight trend of higher levels of interconnectedness among cyber dyads 
than non-cyber dyads per the variables and measures employed by this research. This 
might be another dimension that warrants additional study, particularly as it could shed 
light as to why cyber activity, on the whole, has been relatively restrained in severity. As 
with kinetic war, do close ties help avoid escalation?  
 
 
My research yielded one highly significant result. It showed that the odds of a cyber 
event within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear power are about 10 times greater than if 
neither is, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 times greater.  There does not appear to be any 
correlation between a dyad having two nuclear weapon states and a there being a higher volume 
of cyber events. There is, however, a positive correlation between which country in the dyad is 
the nuclear weapon state and which country is the initiator of a cyber event. This was determined 
by revisiting the original Valeriano and Maness data set shows that for 85 percent of the 
incidents and disputes included, the nuclear weapon state was the initiator of the operation.  
This does not mean that having nuclear weapons necessarily causes states to take action 
in the cyber sphere. The United Kingdom and France do not have any incidents or disputes 
attributed to them, at least within this data set.  What it might indicate though is that there is 
another intervening variable that connect the two, such as the strength, and power, that comes 
with having nuclear weapons either gives courage to also take aggressive action in cyber space 
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or that conversely, it can act as a deterrent and restraint, or simply indicates a high level of 
technological achievement. Possession of nuclear weapons is an intervening variable.  
A comparison of the two case studies presented in this thesis supports that suggestion.  
Chinese cyber operations against Japan tended to be somewhat more antagonistic or ‘hostile’ 
than those conducted against the United States. There are more operations against the U.S. than 
against Japan, but a greater number of them are theft or espionage operations meant to collect 
information in order to advance Chinese military or other technology. Some of the operations 
against Japan have also been for this purpose, but others are meant to be disabling and correlate 
to disputes or conflicts between the two countries. This may reflect that the Chinese are less 
afraid of attacking the Japanese than they are the Americans; Japan is an important country but 
certainly less powerful than the U.S. and currently lacks the ability to retaliate. Of course, it 
could be argued that technically Japan falls under American military protection although it’s not 
entirely clear how this protection would extend to a cyber attack.  
Given the statistical result with respect to nuclear weapons and observations made from 
comparing the two case studies, I believe that there is a need for additional research on how 
power factors into use of cyber weapons. As noted in Chapter Four, power can be defined many 
ways but typically involves some measure of military capacity, including through nuclear 
weapons, wealth or productivity.  This might lead to a different formulation or result on the 
asymmetry variable as well.  
This thesis further explored potential implications of the overlap between nuclear weapon 
states and ‘cyber weapon states’ (a term used very loosely) and noted the following:  
- Cyber weapons are not replacing nuclear weapons because they are more acceptable. 
There are significant differences between the two types of weapons and moreover, the 
objectives and targets being sought after in cyber operations could not be accomplished 




- The overlap between cyber and nuclear weapon states may relate to technological 
sophistication or wealth, although not every nuclear weapon state is economically well-
developed.  
 
- It’s not yet clear if having cyber weapons will become a power symbol, thus allowing a 
privileged group of countries to dominate cyber security dialogues. A move away from 
the state-centric realist model towards a more open and liberal international order 
indicates that this will not be the case, as does the substantial role that non-state and non-
military actors play in cyber space.  
 
- Deterrence theory, as developed in relation to nuclear weapons, cannot be applied 
wholesale to cyber space and does not need to be although it’s feasible that states may 
look to what they know and recognize from their nuclear history to make sense of cyber 
warfare and cyber space.   
 
The ubiquity of cyber space and the rate at which it is being militarized leaves policymakers 
and political leaders facing unique challenges in a largely unfamiliar landscape. The objective of 
this thesis was to shed light on how, when and why states are using cyber technology against one 
another in the belief that this information is vital to the development of policies and laws that are 
effective because they are rooted in reality. Apart from the observations summarized above, 
there are a few additional recommendations for policymakers based on this research.  
First, bridging differences of opinion and understanding is paramount. This pertains not 
only to terminology but also to wider approaches on the subject. As we saw in the China-U.S. 
case study, two very powerful actors who are very active in cyber space have fundamentally 
different interpretations as to what ‘cyber security’ includes. They also differ on what is and is 
not acceptable behavior. Other actors have yet additional interpretations. This is a stumbling 
block for multi-lateral initiatives including defensive ones.  
Second, and related to the point above, is the need to reconcile the multiplicity of 
approaches to the cyber sphere and ‘what to do’ about it. Part of what makes it difficult to find 
agreement on terminology is that every state or entity comes to the cyber issue from a different 
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perspective, in the same way that they approach any other issue of common concern. This breeds 
dispute as to what the ultimate policy goal should be. Is the ideal to prevent the militarization of 
cyber space? Is it to accept that that may be impossible and instead develop guidelines and codes 
of conduct to regulate use? Is it better to prioritize cyber crime over interstate cyber warfare or 
the acts of non-state actors over that of government actors? Further complicating matters are 
varying perspectives on the applicability of international law and international humanitarian law 
to cyber space. The last few years have seen a proliferation of agreements and discussion fora 
being convened on the broader cyber issue. This includes regional declarations and conventions 
from ASEAN and the African Union; the Group of Governmental Experts on Information 
Communications Technology convened at the United Nations; the Chinese-American Working 
Group described in this thesis and the London Process of meetings, among others. There is a 
Cybercrime Convention in place and Russia and China continue to push for a global cyber 
weapons treaty in the context of the UN. NATO very recently declared that its Article V will be 
extended to cyber attacks. Some of these initiatives are very different from one another and 
address different aspects of cyber security, yet others are overlapping and do not have a clearly 
articulated purpose. At this stage it is definitely helpful to have spaces for dialogue in order to 
arrive at the mutual understanding and agreement such as mentioned in my first 
recommendation, yet there is also a danger of too much talk, and not enough action, or of overlap 
and contradiction.  
Finally, the non-state dimension of cyber security is highly important. It is also multi-
dimensional. For example, there are non-state actors such APT1 who become proxies for 
government operations. China is not the only state that employs this approach. Then there are 
non-state actors that are independent of government sponsorship or patriotic motivations. As 
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with many other issues, how to engage these groups meaningfully is a challenge for the 
international community. There is a perpetual worry about cyber terrorism and how to curtail it, 
as with all forms of terrorism. On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are non-state actors 
whose expertise in computer engineering and software is vital to building stronger defenses. 
Including these experts and technicians in policy dialogues is absolutely critical. Yet in some 
fora they are shut out in favor of politicians or diplomats with very little technical or subject 
matter knowledge. This needs to change.  
This thesis undertook to prove what causes a cyber interaction between two rival states. 
While there is extensive analysis and writing about specific cyber incidents - which has 
generated some common ideas about the reasons why states conduct them – there is very little 
quantitative analysis available to support any theories about use or predict future action, despite 
the growing importance of the cyber domain. This thesis has made an important contribution in 
furthering research on the subject in a scientific and quantifiable way and within an international 
relations framework. While the theories put forward were ultimately shown to have no 
explanatory power, ruling them out as possibilities is still an important step in better 
understanding why states engage in cyber acts against one other.  The analysis led to other 
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Appendix 1: Cyber Rivalry Dataset Codebook 
 
 
dyad Dyad identifier 
dyad_name Names of the countries in the dyad 
riv_num Unique rivalry number from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) 
rival_a   Name of rival a 
cow_code_a Correlates of War country code for rival a 
avg_gdp_a_09 Average 2001-2009 GDP of rival a measured in current 
millions USD  
avg_gdp_a_11 Average 2001-2011 GDP of rival a measured in current 
millions USD  
avg_mil_a Average 2001-2009 military expenditure of rival a measured in 
millions USD at 2011 prices 
rival_b Name of rival b 
cow_code_b Correlates of War country code for rival b 
avg_gdp_b_09 Average 2001 – 2009 GDP of rival b measured in current 
millions USD 
avg_gdp_b_11 Average 2001 – 2011 GDP of rival b measured in current 
millions USD 
avg_mil_b Average 2001-2009 military expenditures of rival a measured 
in millions USD at 2011 prices 
cyber_interaction Existence of a cyber interaction (either dispute or incident) 
within the dyad 2001-2011 
0 No 
1 Yes 
cyber_disp_count Count of cyber disputes experienced within the dyad 2001-2011 
incident_count Count of cyber incidents within the dyad 2001-2011 
proto Rivalry type is a proto rivalry  
0 No 
1 Yes 
strat Rivalry type is a strategic rivalry  
0 No 
1 Yes  









severity Average severity level of all cyber interactions (disputes and 
incidents) within the dyad 2001-2011 adapted from Valeriano 
and Maness (YEAR) 




2 Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or military (financial 
sector blip, DoD hacked)  
3 Dramatic effect on a country's specific strategy, (Stuxnet, 
Flame, jet plans, R & D) 
4 Dramatic effect on entire country or large region (Power grid 
down, stock market collapse) 
5 Devastating effect on country, (Catastrophe) 
gdp_diff Percentage difference between the average GDP of rival a and 
of rival b 2001-2009 
mil_diff_20012009 Percentage difference between average military expenditure of 
rival a and of rival b 2001-2009 
terr_disp_pre2001 Existence of a territorial dispute within the dyad before 2001 
0 No 
1 Yes 
terr_disp_20012011 Existence of a territorial dispute within the dyad 2001-2011 
0 No 
1 Yes 
terr_disp Existence of at least one territorial dispute 1945 onwards 
0 No 
1 Yes 
wto_disp Existence of a trade dispute at the World Trade Organization 
within the dyad 2001-2011 
0 No 
1 Yes 
mids_count Count of Militarized Interstate Disputes experienced by the 
dyad pre-2001 based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl data set 
riv5.10all 
hist_rivalry_days Length of the rivalry in days based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
data set riv5.10all 
rivalry_intensity1 Intensity of the rivalry (mean of territorial disputes pre 2001, 
wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, and mids_count, each scaled with 
a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one) 
rivalry_intensity2 Intensity of the rivalry (mean of territorial disputes 2001-2011, 
wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, and mids_count, each scaled with 
a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one) 
rivalry_intensity3 Intensity of the rivalry (mean of territorial disputes since 1945 
wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, and mids_count, each scaled with 
a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one) 
rivalry_intensity4 Intensity of the rivalry (mean of wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, 
and mids_count, each scaled with a minimum value of zero and 
a maximum of one) 
treaty_count Count of bilateral treaties between the two countries in the dyad 
based on the World Treaty Index 
a_import_from_b Country a’s imports from country b in current millions USD, 
2001-2009 average from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) 
b_import_from_a Country b’s imports from country a in current millions USD, 
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2001-2009 average from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) 
a_trade_depend_on_b Country a’s trade dependence on country b in currents millions 
USD 2001-2009 (a_import_from_b / avg_gdp_a_09) 
b_trade_depend_on_a Country b’s trade dependence on country a in currents millions 
USD 2001-2009 (b_import_from_a / avg_gdp_b_09) 
trade_interdepend Trade interdependence (sum of a_trade_depend_on_b and 
b_trade_depend_on_a) 
trade_interdepend2 Trade interdependence (sum of a_trade_depend_on_b and 
b_trade_depend_on_a, then scaled with a minimum value of 
zero and a maximum of one) 
civ_a Civilization type of country a 
1 African  
2 Buddhist  
3 Hindu  
4 Islamic  
5 Japanese  
6 Latin American 
7 Orthodox  
8 Sinic  
9 Western  
10 Other 
civ_b Civilization type of country b 
1 African  
2 Buddhist  
3 Hindu  
4 Islamic  
5 Japanese  
6 Latin American  
7 Orthodox  
8 Sinic 
9 Western  
10 Other 
civ_diff Civilizational difference 
0  same  
1  different 
nuclear Dyadic possession of nuclear weapons  
0 Neither rival has nuclear weapons 
1 One rival has nuclear weapons  
2 Both rivals have nuclear weapons 
region_diff 
 




dyad dyad_name riv_num rival_a cow_code_a avg_gdp_a_09 avg_gdp_a_11 avg_mil_a rival_b cow_code_b avg_gdp_b_09 avg_gdp_b_11 avg_mil_b gdp_diff mil_diff_20012009 cyber_interaction cyber_disp_count incident_count proto strat endur nonriv severity terr_disp_pre2001 terr_disp_20012011 terr_disp wto_disp hist_rivalry_days mids_count treaty_count a_import_from_b b_import_from_a civ_a civ_b civ_diff nuclear region_diff hist_rivalry_days2 treaty_count2 mids_count2 a_trade_depend_on_b b_trade_depend_on_a trade_interdepend rivalry_intensity1 rivalry_intensity2 rivalry_intensity3 rivalry_intensity4 log_mids_count log_treaty_counttrade_interdepend2
1 North Korea -Japan 1324 North Korea 731 Japan 740 4450489.5 4669870 60582.332 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 19200 12 18 183.6222229 110.2833328 8 5 1 1 1 0.247027948 0.045801528 0.203389823 2.478E-05 0.112604439 0.112604439 0.112604439 0.150139257 2.484906673 2.890371799
2 Russia - Georgia 983 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Georgia 372 7084.333496 8115.272727 485.566681 122.93364 98.57028198 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3415 8 0 81.27222443 318.7733459 7 7 0 1 1 0.043937523 0 0.135593221 9.61252E-05 0.044996943 0.045093067 0.294882685 0.294882685 0.294882685 0.059843581 2.079441547 0.2361072
3 US - Iran 85 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Iran 630 218081.1094 258651.2727 11795.7773 49.8300285 47.35883713 1 2 7 1 0 0 0 2.22219992 0 0 0 0 6544 11 68 147.6444397 195.4155579 9 4 1 1 0 0.084195361 0.173027992 0.186440676 1.18449E-05 0.000896068 0.000907913 0.067659006 0.067659006 0.067659006 0.09021201 2.397895336 4.219507694 0.0047538
4 China - Japan 11298 China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 Japan 740 4450489.5 4669870 60582.332 13.8063803 1.296278119 1 7 7 0 0 1 0 2.22219992 1 1 1 1 7764 7 45 144626.9688 102629.9609 8 5 1 1 1 0.099891923 0.114503816 0.118644066 0.053508725 0.023060376 0.076569103 0.554633975 0.554633975 0.554633975 0.406178653 1.945910096 3.80666256 0.4009157
5 India - Bangladesh 1340 India 750 851552 1012665.455 35519.8906 Bangladesh 771 65554 73680 985 13.7441025 36.06080246 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9143 12 26 141.678894 2072.881104 3 4 1 1 1 0.117634192 0.066157758 0.203389823 0.000166377 0.031620972 0.031787351 0.580255985 0.580255985 0.580255985 0.440341353 2.484906673 3.258096457 0.1664385
6 China - Vietnam 1306 China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 Vietnam 816 57898.10938 67840 1959.57141 4.9858489 40.07588196 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 8348 17 1 3473.953369 10075.83887 8 8 0 1 1 0.107405692 0.002544529 0.288135588 0.001285285 0.174027085 0.17531237 0.348885328 0.348885328 0.348885328 0.131847098 2.833213329 0 0.9179352
7 US - Syria 92 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Syria 652 33316.33203 38540 2181.22217 334.421387 256.1106873 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9420 5 35 255.4666595 402.4677734 9 4 1 1 0 0.121198088 0.089058526 0.084745765 2.0495E-05 0.012080194 0.012100689 0.051485963 0.051485963 0.051485963 0.068647951 1.609437943 3.555348158 0.0633592
8 Iraq - Kuwait 1230 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 Kuwait 690 81731 94470 4886.77783 1.51244557 1.876402617 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 14525 25 1 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 0.186879218 0.002544529 0.423728824 0 0 0 0.15265201 0.15265201 0.15265201 0.203536019 3.218875885 0 0
9 South Korea - Japan 1330 South Korea 730 784177 839630 24698.4453 Japan 740 4450489.5 4669870 60582.332 5.56181908 2.452880621 1 5 7 0 0 1 0 1.16666996 1 1 1 1 16818 19 62 45478.15625 22587.40039 8 5 1 0 1 0.216381043 0.157760814 0.322033912 0.057994761 0.005075262 0.063070022 0.634603739 0.634603739 0.634603739 0.512804985 2.944438934 4.127134323 0.3302345
10 China - Philippines 1309 China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 Philippines 840 116625.5547 133210 2382.88892 2.53914881 32.9564476 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 18507 12 5 17058.28125 4678.62793 8 10 1 1 1 0.238111779 0.012722646 0.203389823 0.006311181 0.04011666 0.046427842 0.360375404 0.110375404 0.110375404 0.147167206 2.484906673 1.609437943 0.2430961
11 US - North Korea 104 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 North Korea 731 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 18168 28 1 0.177777782 14.37333298 9 8 1 2 1 0.233750194 0.002544529 0.474576265 1.42624E-08 0.177081615 0.177081615 0.177081615 0.236108825 3.33220458 0
12 US - China 10101 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 38.1048965 7.113501549 1 5 23 0 0 1 0 1.89286005 0 0 0 1 18949 36 54 252562.0938 75545.61719 9 8 1 2 0 0.243798569 0.137404576 0.61016947 0.020262016 0.027950179 0.048212193 0.463492006 0.463492006 0.463492006 0.617989361 3.583518982 3.988984108 0.2524389
13 China - Taiwan 11292 China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 Taiwan 713 350833.4375 372000 9757.11133 1.09981084 8.048647881 1 2 5 0 0 1 0 1.42857003 1 1 1 0 18963 27 0 52279.25391 19720.5918 8 8 0 1 1 0.243978694 0 0.457627118 0.019342149 0.056210697 0.075552844 0.425401449 0.425401449 0.425401449 0.233868599 3.295836926 0.3955945
14 North Korea - South Korea 1323 North Korea 731 South Korea 730 784177 839630 24698.4453 1 3 11 0 0 1 0 1.21429002 1 1 1 0 19200 32 0 0 12.66333294 8 8 0 1 1 0.247027948 0 0.542372882 1.61486E-05 0.447350204 0.447350204 0.447350204 0.263133615 3.465735912
15 Lebanon - Israel 1253 Lebanon 660 23670.77734 26702.81818 1334.33337 Israel 666 147138.2188 162450.45 16515.5547 6.08364439 12.37738323 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 1.5 1 1 1 0 19590 8 1 4 10 1 1 1 0.252045691 0.002544529 0.135593221 0.346909732 0.346909732 0.346909732 0.129212976 2.079441547 0
16 India - Pakistan 1339 India 750 851552 1012665.455 35519.8906 Pakistan 770 114727.2188 128499.6364 6077.3335 7.88068724 5.844650269 1 3 13 0 0 1 0 1.5625 1 0 0 0 19825 46 50 169.7688904 820.9577637 3 4 1 2 1 0.255069226 0.127226457 0.779661 0.000199364 0.007155736 0.0073551 0.508682549 0.258682549 0.258682549 0.344910085 3.828641415 3.912023067 0.0385113
17 US - Russia 77 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 12.9190893 11.67166328 1 3 3 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 20350 59 0 15483.44434 6133.106445 9 7 1 2 0 0.261823893 0 1 0.001242173 0.007253966 0.008496139 0.315455973 0.315455973 0.315455973 0.420607954 4.077537537 0.0444858
18 Iran - Israel Iran 630 218081.1094 258651.2727 11795.7773 Israel 666 147138.2188 162450.45 16515.5547 1.59218562 1.400124311 1 2 11 0 1 0 0 1.92307997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 Russia - Estonia Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Estonia 366 14548.11133 15702.45455 384.666656 63.5340157 124.425766 1 1 4 0 0 0 1 1.60000002 1 1 1 0 1 262.8033447 1019.474426 7 9 1 1 1 0.002544529 0.000310832 0.070076071 0.070386901 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.3685457
20 China - India China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 India 750 851552 1012665.455 35519.8906 2.99392581 2.210917711 1 1 4 0 0 1 0 2.4000001 1 1 1 0 15 16064.72656 16430.17383 8 3 1 2 1 0.038167939 0.005943588 0.019294387 0.025237974 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 2.708050251 0.132146
21 Canada - Russia 127 Canada 20 1109434.5 1210970 18586.2227 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 1.21383464 2.575157166 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 999 4 7 1182.317749 720.0111084 9 7 1 1 0 0.012853173 0.017811704 0.06779661 0.001065694 0.000851597 0.001917291 0.020162446 0.020162446 0.020162446 0.026883261 1.386294365 1.945910096 0.0100389
22 US - Afghanistan 97 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 7428.8 232.571426 1734.95044 2401.990479 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1184 4 38 55 423.487793 9 4 1 1 0 0.01523339 0.096692115 0.06779661 4.41242E-06 0.057669368 0.057673778 0.0207575 0.0207575 0.0207575 0.027676666 1.386294365 3.637586117 0.3019798
23 Vietnam - Philippines 1362 Vietnam 816 57898.10938 67840 1959.57141 Philippines 840 116625.5547 133210 2382.88892 1.96359086 1.216025591 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 442 4 0 8 10 1 0 1 0.005686789 0 0.06779661 0.268370837 0.268370837 0.268370837 0.024494467 1.386294365
24 Taiwan - Japan 1316 Taiwan 713 350833.4375 372000 9792.36328 Japan 740 4450489.5 4669870 60582.332 12.5534143 6.186691761 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 608 4 6 38919.61719 14272.33789 8 5 1 0 1 0.007822552 0.015267176 0.06779661 0.110934742 0.003206914 0.114141658 0.268904805 0.268904805 0.268904805 0.025206387 1.386294365 1.791759491 0.5976455
25 Taiwan - Vietnam 1318 Taiwan 713 350833.4375 372000 9792.36328 Vietnam 816 57898.10938 67840 1959.57141 5.48349047 4.997196674 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 344 4 0 8 8 0 0 1 0.004425917 0 0.06779661 0.268055618 0.268055618 0.268055618 0.024074176 1.386294365
26 Russia - Latvia 978 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Latvia 367 18544.22266 19847.09091 424.333344 50.2663078 112.7944489 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1853 4 4 322.0911255 834.7977905 7 9 1 1 1 0.02384077 0.010178117 0.06779661 0.000380955 0.045016598 0.045397554 0.272909343 0.272909343 0.272909343 0.030545793 1.386294365 1.386294365 0.2377015
27 Russia - Turkey 1001 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Turkey 640 458780.5625 511600 17243 1.95003915 2.775760889 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2564 10 0 2370.124512 14058.45508 7 4 1 1 1 0.032988522 0 0.169491529 0.002803278 0.030643092 0.033446372 0.050620012 0.050620012 0.050620012 0.067493349 2.302585125 0.1751251
28 Russia - Azerbaijan 984 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Azerbaijan 373 20524.22266 7428.8 972.666687 134.293564 49.20744705 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2235 4 0 209.8688965 745.8422241 7 4 1 1 1 0.028755596 0 0.06779661 0.000248224 0.036339607 0.036587831 0.274138063 0.024138052 0.274138063 0.032184068 1.386294365 0.1915738
29 China - North Korea 1294 China 710 2702867 338240 78531.5547 North Korea 731 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1745 6 147 509.0055542 1256.682251 8 8 0 2 1 0.022451237 0.374045789 0.101694912 0.000188321 0.281036526 0.281036526 0.281036526 0.041382048 1.791759491 4.990432739
30 Russia - Ukraine 982 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Ukraine 369 92157.44531 102750 3219.11108 9.70939159 14.86821747 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1350 5 1 8110.883301 12411.93066 7 7 0 1 1 0.017369153 0.002544529 0.084745765 0.009593192 0.134681806 0.144274995 0.275528729 0.275528729 0.275528729 0.034038305 1.609437943 0 0.7554235
31 Netherlands - Iraq 497 Netherlands 210 640688.6875 673195.2727 12030.333 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 10.7777205 4.619352341 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3350 3 3 827.1333618 92.21221924 9 4 1 0 0 0.043101229 0.007633588 0.050847456 0.001291007 0.001784839 0.003075846 0.023487171 0.023487171 0.023487171 0.031316228 1.098612309 1.098612309 0.0161051
32 Italy - Iraq 866 Italy 325 1752308.625 1824690 41996 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 29.2129192 16.12543106 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3350 3 3 2354.348877 346.4500122 9 4 1 0 0 0.043101229 0.007633588 0.050847456 0.00134357 0.006705808 0.008049378 0.023487171 0.023487171 0.023487171 0.031316228 1.098612309 1.098612309 0.0421465
33 Iraq - Egypt 1220 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 Egypt 651 113516.5547 133818.5455 4796.77783 2.14240789 1.841844797 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3360 3 2 192.2233276 4.03111124 4 4 0 0 1 0.043229889 0.005089059 0.050847456 0.003720631 3.55112E-05 0.003756143 0.023519337 0.023519337 0.023519337 0.031359114 1.098612309 0.693147182 0.0196672
34 France - Iraq 579 France 220 2123544.5 2225720 65159.7773 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 35.6333275 25.0197525 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3363 10 11 933.4500122 371.4533386 9 4 1 1 0 0.043268487 0.027989822 0.169491529 0.000439572 0.007189767 0.007629339 0.053190004 0.053190004 0.053190004 0.070920005 2.302585125 2.397895336 0.0399472
35 Iraq - UAE 1233 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 UAE 696 192372.3281 21741 10234.7773 2.87299347 3.929903269 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3386 5 0 0 3.035555601 4 4 0 0 0 0.043564409 0 0.084745765 0 1.57796E-05 1.57796E-05 0.032077543 0.032077543 0.032077543 0.042770058 1.609437943 8.262E-05
36 US- Iraq 89 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 206.343887 214.5018616 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5261 18 26 10086.21094 1171.854492 9 4 1 1 0 0.067688227 0.066157758 0.305084735 0.000809175 0.022682151 0.023491327 0.09319324 0.09319324 0.09319324 0.124257654 2.890371799 3.258096457 0.1230005
37 Greece - Iraq 931 Greece 350 244404.5625 256099.81 9724.22266 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 4.10010624 3.7338624 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6284 7 2 123.4477768 21.07333374 9 4 1 1 0 0.080850191 0.005089059 0.118644066 0.000505096 0.000407891 0.000912987 0.049873564 0.049873564 0.049873564 0.066498086 1.945910096 0.693147182 0.0047804
38 Iran - Turkey 1187 Iran 630 218081.1094 258651.2727 11795.7773 Turkey 640 458780.5625 511600 17243 1.97795272 1.461794257 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7279 12 28 1102.482178 3655.022217 4 4 0 0 1 0.093651898 0.071246818 0.203389823 0.005055377 0.00796682 0.013022197 0.074260429 0.074260429 0.074260429 0.09901391 2.484906673 3.33220458 0.0681842
39 Iran - Afghanistan 1199 Iran 630 218081.1094 258651.2727 11795.7773 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 232.571426 50.71894455 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 7365 10 15 3.708889008 0 4 4 0 0 1 0.094758376 0.038167939 0.169491529 1.70069E-05 0 1.70069E-05 0.31606248 0.31606248 0.31606248 0.088083304 2.302585125 2.708050251 8.905E-05
40 US - Canada 1 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Canada 20 1109434.5 1210970 18586.2227 10.6432037 30.05636787 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 8293 7 393 267445.5625 188081.8906 9 9 0 1 1 0.106698059 1 0.118644066 0.021456055 0.169529513 0.19098556 0.556335509 0.306335539 0.306335539 0.408447385 1.945910096 5.973809719 1
41 Iraq - Saudi Arabia 11229 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 Saudi Arabia 670 294368.3438 332540 35629.8906 5.32389832 13.68100166 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 14665 7 3 0 0.280999988 4 4 0 1 1 0.188680455 0.007633588 0.118644066 0 9.54586E-07 9.54586E-07 0.076831132 0.076831132 0.076831132 0.102441505 1.945910096 1.098612309 4.998E-06
42 Thailand - Vietnam 1351 Thailand 800 190344.4375 215580 3904.31079 Vietnam 816 57898.10938 67840 1959.57141 3.17777133 1.992430925 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 12460 8 0 0 2 8 1 0 1 0.16031085 0 0.135593221 0 0.073976018 0.073976018 0.073976018 0.09863469 2.079441547
43 US - Cuba 4 US 2 12464806 12888600 558634.313 Cuba 40 75.1142883 7437.125 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 13556 17 40 0.100000001 393.6166687 9 6 0 1 1 0.174412027 0.101781167 0.288135588 8.02259E-09 0.365636915 0.1156369 0.365636915 0.154182538 2.833213329 3.68887949
44 Turkey - Iraq 11208 Turkey 640 458780.5625 511600 17243 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 8.19061279 6.620888233 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 15749 21 18 481.3155518 2423.946777 4 4 0 0 0 0.202627242 0.045801528 0.355932206 0.001049119 0.046917368 0.047966488 0.389639854 0.389639854 0.389639854 0.186186478 3.044522524 2.890371799 0.2511524
45 UK - Iraq 463 UK 200 2172944.75 2207970 58023.2227 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 35.3491554 22.27949142 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 15787 19 25 2.513333321 209.7344513 9 4 1 1 0 0.203116149 0.063613228 0.322033912 1.15665E-06 0.004059573 0.004060729 0.131287515 0.131287515 0.131287515 0.17505002 2.944438934 3.218875885 0.021262
46 Turkey - Syria 11212 Turkey 640 458780.5625 511600 17243 Syria 652 33316.33203 38540 2181.22217 13.2745199 7.905200958 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 15945 14 12 393.7988892 942.5933228 4 4 0 0 1 0.205148995 0.030534351 0.237288132 0.00085836 0.028292229 0.02915059 0.360609293 0.360609293 0.360609293 0.147479042 2.639057398 2.484906673 0.1526324
47 Afghanistan - Pakistan 1285 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 7428.8 232.571426 Pakistan 770 114727.2188 128499.6364 6077.3335 17.2974949 26.13104057 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 19238 13 1 4.559999943 1.090000033 4 4 0 1 1 0.247516856 0.002544529 0.220338985 0.000620968 9.5008E-06 0.000630469 0.366963953 0.366963953 0.366963953 0.155951947 2.564949274 0 0.0033011
48 Iraq - Israel 11227 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 Israel 666 147138.2188 162450.45 16515.5547 2.60079885 6.341567516 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 18483 10 0 0 4 10 1 1 1 0.237802997 0 0.169491529 0 0.101823628 0.101823628 0.101823628 0.135764837 2.302585125
49 UK - Russia 439 UK 200 2172944.75 2207970 58023.2227 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 2.21319318 1.212291241 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 21994 22 16 7266.444336 3198.007813 9 7 1 2 1 0.282975644 0.040712468 0.372881353 0.003344054 0.003782461 0.007126515 0.163964242 0.163964242 0.163964242 0.218619004 3.091042519 2.77258873 0.0373144
50 Iran - Iraq 11189 Iran 630 218081.1094 258651.2727 11795.7773 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 4.14095449 4.529288769 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 23568 31 18 43.10555649 0 4 4 0 0 1 0.303226799 0.045801528 0.525423706 0.000197658 0 0.000197658 0.457162619 0.457162619 0.457162619 0.276216835 3.433987141 2.890371799 0.0010349
51 Russia - Japan 11014 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Japan 740 4450489.5 4669870 60582.332 4.68091679 1.26575923 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 51164 53 0 6634.983398 6965.549805 7 5 1 1 0 0.658277988 0 0.898305058 0.007847563 0.00156512 0.009412684 0.889145732 0.889145732 0.889145732 0.852194369 3.970291853 0.0492848
52 Guinea - Liberia 1067 Guinea 438 3600 3790 121.75 Liberia 450 616.222229 699 6.81111002 5.4220314 17.87520599 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 652 4 0 0.26111111 1.320000052 4 1 1 0 1 0.008388657 0 0.06779661 7.25309E-05 0.002142085 0.002214615 0.02539509 0.02539509 0.019046318 0.02539509 1.386294365 0.0115957
53 Chad - Rwanda 1092 Chad 483 5060 57971.81818 222.020004 Rwanda 517 2960 3472.454545 76.9545441 16.694767 2.885079622 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 945 3 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 1 0.012158407 0 0.050847456 0 0 0 0.021001954 0.021001954 0.015751466 0.021001954 1.098612309 0
54 Liberia - Nigeria 1071 Liberia 450 616.222229 699 6.81111002 Nigeria 475 1117590.75 137092.8182 1544.27271 196.12706 226.7285004 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 419 3 0 0 1.363333344 1 10 1 0 1 0.00539087 0 0.050847456 0 1.21989E-06 1.21989E-06 0.018746108 0.018746108 0.014059582 0.018746108 1.098612309 6.387E-06
55 Guinea - Sierra Leone 1068 Guinea 438 3600 3790 121.75 Sierra Leone 451 1320 14439 32.2454529 3.80976248 3.77572608 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1470 4 2 0.614444435 2.696666718 4 1 1 0 1 0.018913077 0.005089059 0.06779661 0.000170679 0.002042929 0.002213608 0.028903229 0.028903229 0.271677434 0.028903229 1.386294365 0.693147182 0.0115904
56 Trinidad - Venezuela 182 Trinidad & Tobago 16140 17061.90909 114 Venezuela 101 178000 200462.7273 3104.27271 11.7491379 27.23046303 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1036 6 2 337.6233215 67.1922226 10 6 1 0 1 0.013329216 0.005089059 0.101694912 0.020918421 0.000377484 0.021295905 0.038341377 0.038341377 0.028756032 0.038341377 1.791759491 0.693147182 0.1115053
57 DRC - Rwanda 1101 DRC 490 7961.333496 9096.454545 226.444443 Rwanda 517 2960 3472.454545 76.9545441 2.61960363 2.942574024 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1743 4 0 13.42888927 12.23222256 1 1 0 0 1 0.022425506 0 0.06779661 0.001686764 0.004132508 0.005819272 0.030074039 0.030074039 0.27255553 0.030074039 1.386294365 0.0304697
58 Djibouti - Eritrea 1137 Djibouti 522 758.333313 838.272727 50.5999985 Eritrea 531 1147.111084 1367 610.333313 1.63073421 12.06192398 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1113 4 0 4 0 1 0.014319901 0 0.06779661 0.02737217 0.02737217 0.270529121 0.02737217 1.386294365
59 Eritrea - Yemen 1145 Eritrea 531 1147.111084 1367 610.333313 Yemen 679 17300 20335 1435.11108 14.8756399 2.351356268 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1378 6 0 5.073333263 0.230000004 4 4 0 0 1 0.017729402 0 0.101694912 0.004422704 1.32948E-05 0.004435999 0.039808106 0.039808106 0.279856086 0.039808106 1.791759491 0.0232269
60 Tanzania - Burundi 1126 Tanzania 510 14010 15617 201.818176 Burundi 516 861 990 88.6888885 15.7747478 2.275574684 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1813 6 0 0.05111111 18.91333389 1 0 1 0.023326129 0 0.101694912 3.64819E-06 0.021966707 0.021970356 0.041673679 0.041673679 0.03125526 0.041673679 1.791759491 0.1150367
61 Congo - Angola 1096 Congo 484 6420 77143.63636 119.17778 Angola 540 37780 47430 24273.8301 1.62647343 203.6774902 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 887 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.011412176 0 0.06779661 0 0 0 0.026402928 0.026402928 0.019802196 0.026402928 1.386294365 0
62 Eritrea - Sudan 1144 Eritrea 531 1147.111084 1367 610.333313 Sudan 625 31590 37548.45455 1732.66663 27.4677792 2.838885784 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1539 4 0 0.932222247 1.015555501 4 4 0 0 1 0.019800834 0 0.06779661 0.00081267 3.2148E-05 0.000844818 0.029199148 0.029199148 0.021899361 0.029199148 1.386294365 0.0044235
63 DRC - Angola 1103 DRC 490 7961.333496 9096.454545 226.444443 Angola 540 37780 47430 14789.1758 5.21411943 65.31039429 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 952 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.012248469 0 0.06779661 0 0 0 0.026681693 0.026681693 0.02001127 0.026681693 1.386294365 0
64 Saudi Arabia - Yemen 1272 Saudi Arabia 670 294368.3438 332540 37916.4531 Yemen 679 17300 20335 1435.11108 16.3530865 26.42057037 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1366 4 0 168.9533386 481.1633301 4 4 0 0 1 0.017575009 0 0.06779661 0.000573952 0.027812909 0.028386861 0.028457206 0.028457206 0.271342903 0.028457206 1.386294365 0.1486335
65 Albania - Greece 887 Albania 339 8287.555664 9070.727273 165.090912 Greece 350 244404.5625 256099.81 9724.22266 28.2336578 58.90222549 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1257 4 7 470.0577698 58.17222214 4 7 1 0 1 0.01617261 0.017811704 0.06779661 0.056718506 0.000238016 0.056956522 0.02798974 0.02798974 0.020992305 0.02798974 1.386294365 1.945910096 0.2982242
66 Nicaragua - Colombia 237 Nicaragua 93 5006.555664 5335.272727 45.1727257 Colombia 100 155250 182559.6364 8869.5459 34.2174873 196.3473511 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2787 4 1 11.48666668 2.507777691 6 6 0 0 1 0.035857651 0.002544529 0.06779661 0.002294325 1.61532E-05 0.002310478 0.034551419 0.034551419 0.275913566 0.034551419 1.386294365 0 0.0120977
67 Belize - Guatemala 202 Belize 80 1130 1185.181818 13.0816669 Guatemala 90 28190 31060 215.454544 26.2069492 16.46996117 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2768 10 0 42.91888809 5.371110916 6 6 0 0 1 0.035613194 0 0.169491529 0.037981316 0.000190532 0.03817185 0.40170157 0.40170157 0.551276207 0.40170157 2.302585125 0.1998677
68 Albania - Macedonia 881 Albania 339 8287.555664 9070.727273 165.090912 Macedonia 343 6384.222168 6999.181818 191.454544 1.29596961 1.159691572 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1357 4 0 48.70999908 12.55111122 4 7 1 0 1 0.017459214 0 0.06779661 0.005877487 0.001965958 0.007843444 0.361751944 0.361751944 0.271313965 0.361751944 1.386294365 0.0410683
69 Poland - Russia 765 Poland 290 321040 353682.3636 8070.63623 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 2.82072306 5.930442333 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1371 4 0 9854.119141 3140.463379 9 7 1 1 1 0.017639339 0 0.06779661 0.030694366 0.003714401 0.034408767 0.02847865 0.02847865 0.271358997 0.02847865 1.386294365 0.1801642
70 Armenia - Turkey 1029 Armenia 371 5740 6470 289.363647 Turkey 640 458780.5625 511600 17243 79.0726395 59.58938217 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2707 4 0 89.04222107 0.974444449 7 4 1 0 1 0.034828369 0 0.06779661 0.015512582 2.12399E-06 0.015514706 0.034208328 0.034208328 0.275656253 0.034208328 1.386294365 0.081235
71 PNG - Solomon Islands 1375 PNG 910 5200 6159.181818 58.3090897 Solomon Islands 940 470 520.181818 11.8404408 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1366 4 0 1.177777767 9.125555992 10 0 1 0.017575009 0 0.06779661 0.000226496 0.019416077 0.019642573 0.028457206 0.028457206 0.021342905 0.028457206 1.386294365 0.1028485
72 Afghanistan - Kyrgyzstan 1282 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 7428.8 232.571426 Kyrgyzstan 703 2909.222168 3287.909091 145.327271 2.25942993 1.600328803 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1184 4 0 42.9766655 0.195555553 4 4 0 0 1 0.01523339 0 0.06779661 0.00585244 6.72192E-05 0.00591966 0.027676666 0.027676666 0.0207575 0.027676666 1.386294365 0.0309953
73 Afghanistan - Tajikistan 1281 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 7428.8 232.571426 Tajikistan 702 2760 3386.454545 42 2.19368076 5.537415028 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3142 8 0 13.97444439 16.89444351 4 4 0 0 1 0.040425096 0 0.135593221 0.001903 0.006121175 0.008024176 0.058672771 0.058672771 0.044004578 0.058672771 2.079441547 0.0420146
74 Afghanistan - Uzbekistan 1283 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 7428.8 232.571426 Uzbekistan 704 17680 21985 74.7666702 2.95942807 3.110629797 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2939 10 0 4 4 0 0 1 0.037813287 0 0.169491529 0.069101602 0.069101602 0.051826205 0.069101602 2.302585125
75 Armenia - Azerbaijan 1027 Armenia 371 5740 6470 262.777771 Azerbaijan 373 20524.22266 27962.63636 8814.80566 4.32189131 33.54471207 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3609 14 0 0.001111111 0 7 4 1 0 1 0.046433534 0 0.237288132 1.93573E-07 0 1.93573E-07 0.094573885 0.094573885 0.320930421 0.094573885 2.639057398 1.014E-06
76 Liberia - Sierra Leone 1070 Liberia 450 616.222229 699 6.81111002 Sierra Leone 451 1320 14439 32.2454529 20.6566525 4.73424387 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3733 5 4 0 6.318888664 1 1 0 0 1 0.048028924 0.010178117 0.084745765 0 0.004787037 0.004787037 0.044258229 0.044258229 0.03319367 0.044258229 1.609437943 1.386294365 0.0250649
77 Sudan - Egypt 1185 Sudan 625 31590 37548.45455 1732.66663 Egypt 651 113516.5547 133818.5455 4796.77783 3.5638895 2.76843667 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1886 9 3 325.5377808 73.09999847 4 4 0 0 0 0.024265349 0.007633588 0.152542368 0.01030509 0.000643959 0.010949049 0.058935907 0.058935907 0.29420194 0.058935907 2.197224617 1.098612309 0.0573292
78 Uganda - Rwanda 1111 Uganda 500 9770 3472.454545 329.818176 Rwanda 517 2960 3472.454545 76.9545441 4.28588295 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3930 7 0 1.548888922 60.70222092 1 1 0 0 1 0.050563533 0 0.118644066 0.000158535 0.020507507 0.020666042 0.056402534 0.056402534 0.292301893 0.056402534 1.945910096 0.1082074
79 Germany - Iraq 716 Germany 255 2778.620117 2902.06 48140 Iraq 645 51664.16797 62461.75 2604.33325 21.5232449 18.48457718 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3212 3 0 0.913333356 261.9888916 9 4 1 0 0 0.041325718 0 0.050847456 0.0003287 0.005070998 0.005399698 0.030724391 0.030724391 0.023043294 0.030724391 1.098612309 0.0282728
80 Colombia - Venezuela 257 Colombia 100 155250 182559.6364 8869.5459 Venezuela 101 178000 200462.7273 3104.27271 1.09806705 2.857205629 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 7074 12 22 1029.666626 3027.424561 6 6 0 0 1 0.091014355 0.055979643 0.203389823 0.006632313 0.017008003 0.023640316 0.098134726 0.098134726 0.323601037 0.098134726 2.484906673 3.091042519 0.1237806
81 Cameroon - Nigeria 1081 Cameroon 471 16740 15929.54545 318.636353 Nigeria 475 1117590.75 137092.8182 1544.27271 8.60619736 4.846505165 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6324 11 5 336.8299866 5.26777792 1 10 1 0 1 0.081364833 0.012722646 0.186440676 0.020121265 4.71351E-06 0.02012598 0.089268506 0.089268506 0.316951364 0.089268506 2.397895336 1.609437943 0.1053796
82 Russia - Afghanistan 1009 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 47862.4453 Afghanistan 700 7343.375 7343.375 232.571426 135.855789 205.7967529 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 7930 14 0 7.984444618 111.7900009 7 4 1 1 0 0.102027684 0 0.237288132 9.44365E-06 0.015223245 0.015232689 0.113105275 0.113105275 0.334828943 0.113105275 2.639057398 0.0797583
83 Nicaragua - Costa Rica 234 Nicaragua 93 5006.555664 5335.272727 45.1727257 Costa Rica 94 2192 24820 0 4.65205812 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 7628 10 2 238.9777832 67.44555664 6 6 0 0 1 0.098142147 0.005089059 0.169491529 0.047732972 0.030768959 0.078501932 0.089211226 0.089211226 0.316908419 0.089211226 2.302585125 0.693147182 0.411036
84 Ecuador - Peru 295 Ecuador 130 37491.77734 41882.90909 1456 Peru 135 86040 99694.27273 1671.18176 2.3803091 1.147789717 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 77724 12 11 327.6588745 861.0789185 6 6 0 0 1 1 0.027989822 0.203389823 0.008739486 0.010007891 0.018747378 0.734463274 0.734463274 0.550847471 0.734463274 2.484906673 2.397895336 0.0981612
85 DRC - Uganda 1100 DRC 490 7961.333496 10990.90909 226.444443 Uganda 500 9770 10990.90909 329.818176 1.45650816 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 8830 6 0 51.80222321 0.538888872 1 1 0 0 1 0.113607123 0 0.101694912 0.006506727 5.51575E-05 0.006561885 0.405100673 0.405100673 0.553825498 0.405100673 1.791759491 0.034358
86 Guyana - Suriname 10290 Guyana 110 1460 1630 24.7000008 Suriname 115 1930 2265.454545 1.38984942 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 8949 6 3 15.19777775 6.936666489 10 10 0 0 1 0.115138181 0.007633588 0.101694912 0.010409437 0.003594128 0.014003565 0.072277695 0.072277695 0.304208279 0.072277695 1.791759491 1.098612309 0.0733226
87 Uganda - Sudan 11117 Uganda 500 9770 10990.90909 329.818176 Sudan 625 31590 37548.45455 1732.66663 3.41631937 5.253399372 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 12223 13 0 0.102222219 73.58555603 1 4 1 0 1 0.157261595 0 0.220338985 1.04629E-05 0.002329394 0.002339857 0.12586686 0.12586686 0.344400138 0.12586686 2.564949274 0.0122515
88 Ethiopia - Sudan 1140 Ethiopia 530 15610 10990.90909 466.727264 Sudan 625 31590 37548.45455 1732.66663 3.41631937 3.712374926 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10789 12 0 44.41999817 20.22999954 1 4 1 0 1 0.138811693 0 0.203389823 0.002845612 0.000640393 0.003486004 0.114067174 0.114067174 0.085550383 0.114067174 2.484906673 0.0182527
89 Venezuela - Guyana 10273 Venezuela 101 178000 200462.7273 3104.27271 Guyana 110 31590 1630 24.7000008 122.983269 125.6790543 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 12049 8 1 1.172222257 10.67777824 6 10 1 0 1 0.155022904 0.002544529 0.135593221 6.58552E-06 0.000338011 0.000344597 0.096872039 0.096872039 0.322654039 0.096872039 2.079441547 0 0.0018043
90 Uganda - Kenya 1108 Uganda 500 9770 10990.90909 329.818176 Kenya 501 20710.88867 32144.72727 568 2.92466497 1.722160935 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 11613 12 0 470.7088928 60.49555588 1 1 0 0 1 0.149413303 0 0.203389823 0.048179008 0.002920954 0.051099963 0.117601044 0.117601044 0.338200778 0.117601044 2.484906673 0.2675593
91 Congo - DRC 1095 Congo 484 6420 77143.63636 119.17778 DRC 490 7961.333496 9096.454545 226.444443 8.48062706 1.900055885 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 12474 11 0 3.98444438 1.936666608 1 1 0 0 1 0.160490975 0 0.186440676 0.00062063 0.000243259 0.000863889 0.115643881 0.115643881 0.336732924 0.115643881 2.397895336 0.0045233
92 Greece - Turkey 930 Greece 350 244404.5625 256099.81 20340.6367 Turkey 640 458780.5625 511600 17243 1.99765861 1.179646015 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 16071 34 27 1408.234497 733.2088623 7 4 1 0 1 0.206770107 0.068702288 0.576271176 0.0057619 0.001598169 0.007360069 0.261013746 0.261013746 0.44576031 0.261013746 3.526360512 3.295836926 0.0385373
93 Honduras - Nicaragua 10220 Honduras 91 10370 11450 133.881821 Nicaragua 93 5006.555664 5335.272727 45.1727257 2.14609456 2.963775396 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 16053 22 3 76.59111023 67.23555756 6 6 0 0 1 0.206538528 0.007633588 0.372881353 0.007385835 0.013429504 0.020815339 0.526473284 0.526473284 0.394854963 0.526473284 3.091042519 1.098612309 0.1089891
94 Russia - Norway 991 Russia 365 845483.25 997640 41560.3633 Norway 385 298754.7813 325552.7273 6704.09082 3.06444979 6.199254036 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 16458 17 0 711.3266602 1265.134399 7 9 1 1 1 0.211749271 0 0.288135588 0.000841326 0.004234692 0.005076017 0.499961615 0.499961615 0.624971211 0.499961615 2.833213329 0.026578
95 Thailand - Cambodia 1349 Thailand 800 190340 215580 4182 Cambodia 811 6960 7948.363636 149.181824 27.1225643 28.03314781 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 16254 18 299.1744385 1020.72998 2 2 0 0 1 0.209124595 0.305084735 0.00157179 0.146656603 0.148228392 0.504736423 0.504736423 0.628552318 0.504736423 2.890371799 0.7761236
96 Croatia - BiH 892 Croatia 344 45800 48830 1147.27271 BiH 346 11690 12730.72727 279.125 3.83560181 4.110247135 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1460 6 0 1212.702271 897.0800171 9 4 1 0 1 0.018784417 0 0.101694912 0.026478216 0.076739095 0.103217311 0.040159777 0.040159777 0.280119836 0.040159777 1.791759491 0.5404456
97 Saudi Arabia - Qatar 1274 Saudi Arabia 670 294368.3438 332540 37916.4531 Qatar 694 54410 71836 1552.44446 4.62915516 24.42371178 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1002 3 1 154.7944489 712.2122192 4 4 0 0 1 0.012891771 0.002544529 0.050847456 0.000525853 0.01308973 0.013615583 0.021246409 0.021246409 0.015934806 0.021246409 1.098612309 0 0.0712912
98 Argentina - Yugoslavia 378 Argentina (160) Yugoslavia (345)
99 Poland - Yugoslavia 761 Poland (290) Yugoslavia (345)
100 Czech Republic-Yugoslavia 831 Czech Republic (316) Yugoslavia (345)
101 Yugoslavia - Russia 906 Yugoslavia (345) Russia (365)
102 Yugoslavia - Lithuania 908 Yugoslavia (345) Lithuania (368)
103 Canada - Yugoslavia 121 Canada (20) Yugoslavia (345)
104 Portugal - Yugoslavia 10635 Portugal (235) Yugoslavia (345)
105 Yugoslavia - Norway 914 Yugoslavia (345) Norway (385)
106 Yugoslavia - Denmark 915 Yugoslavia (345) Denmark (390)
107 Yugoslavia - Iceland 916 Yugoslavia (345) Iceland (395)
108 Macedonia - Yugoslavia 890 Macedonia (343) Yugoslavia (345)
109 USA - Yugoslavia 70 USA (2) Yugoslavia (345)
110 UK - Yugoslavia 427 UK (200) Yugoslavia (345)
111 Netherlands - Yugoslavia 493 Netherlands (210) Yugoslavia (345)
112 Belgium - Yugoslavia 510 Belgium (211) Yugoslavia (345)
113 France - Yugoslavia 550 France (220) Yugoslavia (345)
114 Spain - Yugoslavia 613 Spain (230) Yugoslavia (345)
15 Germany - Yugoslavia 683 Germany (255) Yugoslavia (345)
116 Italy - Yugoslavia 839 Italy (325) Yugoslavia (345)
117 Yugoslavia - Greece 896 Yugoslavia (345) Greece (350)
118 Yugoslavia - Turkey 920 Yugoslavia (345) Turkey (640)
119 Yugoslavia - Romania 902 Yugoslavia (345) Romania (360)
120 Croatia - Yugoslavia 891 Croatia (344) Yugoslavia (345)
121 Hungary - Yugoslavia 813 Hungary Yugoslavia (345)
122 Austria - Yugoslavia 803 Austria Yugoslavia (345)
123 Albania - Yugoslavia 885 Albania (339) Yugoslavia (345)
